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NOMOS AND NATION: ON NATION IN AN AGE OF "POPULISM"

John Valery White*
The nomos ... requires no state. And... the creation of legal
meaning- "jurisgenesis"-takesplace always through an essentially
cultural medium. Although the state is not necessarily the creatorof
legal meaning, the creativeprocess is collective or social.
-- Robert Cover

ABSTRACT

Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative points to the need to
recognize a second, novel dimension for understanding rights. His
concept of nomos, applied to competing notions of nation in pluralistic
societies, suggests that the current dimension for understanding rights,
which conceives of them fundamentally as protections for the
individual against the state, is too narrow. Rather a second dimension,
understanding rights of individuals against the nation, and aimed at
ensuring individuals' ability to participate in the development of an
idea of nation, is necessary to avoid "a total crushing of the
jurisgenerative character" of nomoi by the state, or by ascendent
national groups. This need is underscored by the rise of populist
nationalist movements that seek to capture the state to impose on their
fellow citizens a particular vision of the nation. Such groups, like the
segregationist Bob Jones University that Nomos and Narrative
addressed, pose a problem for rights regimes by underscoring the
limits of a state neutrality in the face of illiberal visions of the nation.
This second dimension of rights builds on and ultimately revives the
revolutionary elements of Cover's seminal article - a fitting tribute to

his brilliance.

Denton Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd
School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 1991; B.A., Southern University, 1988.
* Ralph
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INTRODUCTION

Gauging the legacy of a long-lost colleague becomes more
complicated with each passing year. For most of us, the passage of
time will eat away at whatever we have become known for: those who
built on our work will no longer remember it; those who recognized
something great in us will forget; and those who know us will
Most important, perhaps, future
increasingly become inactive.
generations will not know or appreciate our insights. Our legacy will
be minimal, brief, and will die with our close friends. If we are
fortunate, we will leave behind a signature work that takes on a life of
its own and far surpasses our brief time on this earth. Robert Cover's
legacy defies the path most of our legacies will follow. In his all too
brief life, he gifted us several still influential works; he left behind
colleagues who continue to honor his contributions. And there are
many like me who arrived in New Haven after his passing, and who
found inspiration in his intellectual contributions and saw unique
insight in his work. As life marches on, one can marvel at the
prescience of Cover's works and regret that he was never able to help
teach us today. But that nostalgia buries that work in a remote grave.
The harder but more lasting legacy of his work, of anyone's
contributions, is that it provides insights into today's problems.
I mean to honor Robert Cover by connecting his Foreword in
the Harvard Law Review, Nomos and Narrative,' to events newly
resonant presently. My intention is to extend Cover's idea of nomos
and jurisgenesis to the concept of "nation," revealing a need to nurture
an additional, novel perspective on rights aimed at ensuring
individuals' ability to participate in the development of an idea of
nation. In Nomos and Narrative, Cover describes the creation and
destruction of legal meaning in a way that positions the state as a
destroyer of community-created legal meaning in the interest of social
stability. 2 This observation provides an especially valuable way of
thinking about national identity and its relationship to the state. Like
legal meaning, national identity is often taken as given but is created
though complex social and cultural processes. And though the state
has a privileged position in aiding those processes, it is not necessarily
the creator of national identity and, more often than not, operates to

'Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
2 Id. at 11-19.
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promote aspects of one vision over others, frequently destroying
competing visions of nation in the process.
This way of thinking about nation is all the more critical given
the rise of "populist nationalism" here and around the world, along
with the privileged position populist nationalist claim in defining a
"true" national identity. 3 Indeed, much discourse on national identity
has tended to take a national identity in the nation state for granted, has
often presumed a long-existing (and static) national identity, 4 or has
vested in the leaders of states privileged roles in articulating national
values and identities. 5 Popular nationalists seek to exploit the lack of
a formal place for nation in law and generally claim to be working to
preserve a long-standing, static national identity, often by using nation
to claim legitimate authority to run the state and impose their vision of
nation on their fellow citizens. Per Cover, "Authoritative precept may
be national in character-or at least the authoritative text of the
authoritative precepts may be. But the meaning of such a text is always
'essentially contested."' 6 Cover's observations about law suggests a
role for the nomos of distinct groups in developing national narratives.
Following from this analogy, development of national ideals can be
understood to be organic, dynamic, social processes largely
independent of state control yet subject to special state influence and,
I here deploy this
ultimately, the state's jurispathic tendency.
extension of Cover's observations to introduce an additional
dimension for thinking about rights, a dimension made more
significant by technological developments that permit significant
3 See infra note 67 (explaining the importance of a clear definition of "populist
nationalism" which distinguishes it from both populism and nationalism).
4 ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE NATION IN HISTORY: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES

ABOUT ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 27 (2000) ("In the past, many scholars and
most of the educated public assumed that nations and nationalism were, if not
primordial, at least perennial. Nations could be found everywhere in the historical
record, even if they were not part of nature or the human condition per se.").

5

E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE

1780 80-100 (Cambridge

Univ. Press eds., 2d ed. 1992) (1990). Hobsbawm describes states invoking
nationalism after the Age of Revolution to shore up their legitimacy; but Hobsbawm
notes: "While governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate
ideological engineering, it would be a mistake to see these exercises as pure
manipulation from above." Id. at 92. Efforts to invoke national identity "were ...
most successful when they could build on already present unofficial national
sentiments, whether of demonic xenophobia or chauvinism ... or ... nationalism
among the middle and lower middle classes." Id.
6Cover,

supra note 1, at 17.
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cultivation of identities and greater development of normative visions

of right.
Nomos and Narrative is a popular and heralded article. It is
cited for a number of its central principles. However, many who cite
it seem to avoid truly exploring the implications of the article. They
consign it to a grave of distant nostalgia, depriving it of a life in the
present. They seem afraid to consider its implications. Here, I seek to
build on two. First, if discrete, organized communities like religious
communities can develop normative meaning through social and
cultural processes on which legal understanding are built, why limit
this understanding to discrete, organized communities? For Cover this
made sense because he was examining religious communities'
objections to IRS rules before the Supreme Court. 7 The entities under
examination were in fact discrete and organized, many with centuriesold traditions, lending support to this focus. Moreover, an examination
of how the Supreme Court should resolve a difficult question would
not truly benefit from discussion of culture and society creating
meaning from which legal understanding might emerge. But Cover's
nomoi do suggest that, in the background of legal meaning, an array of
cultural and social institutions that might have sufficient organization
and structure to create meaning (nomi) on which legal understandings
can emerge, are being developed. I do not mean to try to trace these
processes. Rather, I assume their existence to engage the question of
how to deal with increasingly contested visions about nation and
collective identity that, in recent years, seem at least as important as
efforts to distill legal meaning from different groups whose narratives
might inform judicial interpretation.
Second, Nomos and Narrative suggested that the judge's and
law's role in mediating different normative understandings, was
inescapably destructive and that courts serve this role best when they
limit such destruction and serve as neutrals of sorts, to the extent
possible while serving the interests of the imperial virtues. 8 The idea
of the nomos is troubling to the extent it suggests a war of all against

? See id. Indeed, Cover envisions a dynamic process that likely is not limited to
organized communities but at least requires "commitment." Id. at 101. "In the
normative universe, legal meaning is created by simultaneous engagement and
disengagement, identification and objectification. Because the nomos is but the
process of human action stretched between vision and reality, a legal interpretation
cannot be valid if no one is prepared to live by it." Id. at 44.
8See Cover, supra note 1, at 48-53.
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all in an unbounded battle for supremacy of juridical meaning. But
Cover suggests that there is a way out of this fate.
It is the problem of the multiplicity of meaning-the
fact that never only one but always many worlds are
created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis-that
leads at once to the imperial virtues and the imperial
mode of world maintenance. Maintaining the world is
no small matter and requires no less energy than
creating it. Let loose, unfettered, the worlds created
would be unstable and sectarian in their social
organization, dissociative and incoherent in their
discourse, wary and violent in their interactions. The
sober imperial mode of world maintenance holds the
mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the
discipline of institutional justice upon norms, and
places the constraint of peace on the void at which
strong bonds cease. 9
Narrative serves as a bridge between nomoi and the state whose
judges' legal interpretations and actions on these narratives resolve
disagreements about the meaning of legal texts. 10 Such interpretation
is jurispathic, to be sure, but its "imperial" function provides stability
in society.
My application of Nomos and Narrative to competing visions
of the nation must operate without the shared text for judges to
interpret as national ideals generally lack memorialization in
authoritative texts even if narratives of nation link national identity to
ethnic, historical, and ideological legacies.
Even where written,
accounts of the nation tend not to have the kind of legal implications
that constitutions possess. Ideas like we are a "nation of immigrants,"
or we are a "nation of free people" do not demarcate approaches to
immigration law or make slavery verboten. The contest over who we
are as a nation is nonetheless significant and eventually affects how we
approach law, informs what we believe appropriate (even legitimate),
9

1d.

at 16.

i See Brett Scharffs, Creation and Preservation in the Constitution of Civil Religion,
41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 985, 994-97 (2010) ("[C]ourts respond to jurisgenesis,
the 'too fertile' proliferation of multiple meanings of a single text or symbol, with an
authoritative voice that chooses which meaning will be given official sanction and
which will enjoy the coercive imprimatur of the state.").
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and frames our interpretation of the Constitution. Consequently, the
role of law and therefore narrative, interpretation, and judicial decision
making is more indirect than the constitutional interpretation and
judicial decision making that occupied Cover in Nomos and Narrative.
However, the role of the state remains the same: to prevent an
unbounded war of all against all over the meaning of the national
identity. 1 Only now the role is to facilitate individual participation in
that process. Cover's vision of the state as secondary in creating legal
meaning1 2 and striving to be neutral 3 suggests a different way of
thinking about rights that the battle over national identity, understood
in light of Cover's nomoi, reveals.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I seeks to reclaim the
inspirational and revolutionary aspects of Nomos and Narrative,
identifying its importance in the face of illiberal populist nationalist
movements. Part II defines the particular movements I define as
populist nationalist and highlights their similarity to some nomoi
Cover discusses. Part III examines how Nomos and Narrative seeks
to address conflicting nomoi. Part IV scrutinizes how Cover's
approach for mediating between conflicting nomoi might be used to
address contests over the meaning of nation; by focusing on Cover's
suggestion that courts avoid "a total crushing the jurisgenerative
character" of nomoi, 14 it suggests a basis for adopting an additional
dimension for understanding rights. This new dimension would add to
the longstanding approach of protecting individuals from the excesses
of the state by also focusing on protecting the individual from the
excesses of the nation with the goal of ensuring that all can participate
in developing a shared national identity.

" Cf Cover, supra note 1, at 55 ("The rule of Walker v. City of Birmingham
subordinates the creation of legal meaning to the interest in public order. It speaks to
the judge as agent of state violence and employer of that violence against the 'private'
disorder of movements, communities, unions, parties, 'people,' 'mobs."').
12 Id. at 11 ("[T]he state is not necessarily the creator of legal meaning, the creative
process is collective or social.").
3
14

Id. at 48-53.
Id. at 62.
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RECOVERING THE RESONANCE OF NOMOS AND NARRATIVE

Nomos and Narrativeis among the more influential law review
articles of all time. 15 The article, and Cover's work more generally,
have inspired a generation of law professors who for years maintained
a Robert Cover meeting in conjunction with the Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting.1 6 Though his scholarship in
general focused on slavery, emancipation, civil rights protections, and
constitutional law, he found inspiration and insight in Jewish religious
study and traditions; Nomos and Narrative is cited in an interesting
mix of studies on religion, native American sovereignty, L.G.B.T.Q.+
rights, and difference more generally.' 7 Naturally, as an article
associated with the then rising law and literature movement, the article
is cited in those kinds of studies, 18 though perhaps less frequently than
we might imagine. Nomos and Narrative's popularity and influence
seems to have extended well beyond Cover's own work and apparent
interests.
Aside from its popularity, Nomos and Narrative is an article
whose influence is peculiar. The article is influential, inspiring, and
for many eye-opening. At the same time, it is singular in that it
introduces an idea that many acknowledge and find inspiration in and
yet often have not really built upon. It is as if readers see Nomos and
Narrativeand the ideas in it as complete when introduced. While some
will include Nomos and Narrativealong with citations to other articles

See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2012) (being the 16th most cited law review
article as of 2012). A recent Westlaw search shows 1,657 law review articles citing
Nomos and Narrativeon September 21, 2021. See Cover, supra note 1.
16 See, e.g., Soc'y Am. Law Tchr., Robert M. Cover Workshop at Golden Gate
University Law School held in conjunction with the Association of American Law
School Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2017).
" See, e.g., Valerie J. Phillips, ParallelWorlds: A Sideways Approach to Promoting
Indigenous-Nonindigenous Trade and Sustainable Development, 14 MICH. ST. J.
INT'L L. 521, 529-30 (2006) (quoting Cover, supra note 1) (invoking Cover's idea of
a nomos to explain Indian law and its relationship with American law more
generally); Lani Guinier, Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward A
Demosprudence of Law and SocialMovements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2757-58 (2014)
(discussing critical race theory).
"8 See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Beyond Nomos and Narrative:UnconvertedAntinomianism
in the Work of Susan Howe, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 1, 2 (2006) (acknowledging
contribution and offering criticism).
"
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on narrative and the law,1 9 most just cite Nomos and Narrative
standing alone to invoke the idea of the nomos that he introduces and
the legal system's interaction with the normative traditions and the
jurisprudential thinking of those traditions. 2 0 No other sources seem
necessary. For some citing Nomos and Narrative,the citation is a "see,
e.g., citation" for some aspect of the nomos as though there were
countless other articles on the topic, but in fact there are but few that
develop its ideas further. Many who cite Nomos and Narrativedo not
seem to know what to do with it; they honor its insight and erudition
with citations while avoiding engaging its perhaps frightening
implications.
Nomos and Narrative,like its author, is associated with efforts
to produce a just world in a country with a less than stellar history,
particularly on race questions. Both the article and its author were
influential in explaining and justifying the law's early interventions to
dismantle Jim Crow segregation. 2 1 Yet the article turns forty years old
next year and Cover passed away thirty-five years ago. A new law
professor today seeking to engage any of the fields associated with
civil rights, the legacy of racial segregation, and efforts to recognize
and protect marginalized groups is arguably more likely to cite and
find inspiration in Kimberlee Crenshaw's groundbreaking work setting
out the intersectional experience of violence and discrimination,
Mapping the Margins,22 than any of Cover's publications. Nomos and
Narrative, like all scholarly work, is a product of its time and reflects
the assumptions, challenges, and issues extant when it was authored.
So as time has gone by, the work of others has gained prominence and
influence. Yet Nomos andNarrativecontinues to be cited and to exert
influence, though the nature of that influence is not particularly clear.
That is, the revolutionary and inspirational implications of
Nomos andNarrative are not necessarily readily apparent today. The
revolutionary aspect of the article may be hard to fully appreciate today
because of the inverted character of the article. A major part of what
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 17, at 529-30.
See, e.g., Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Justicefor Native Nations: Insights
from Legal Pluralism, 60 ARIZ. L. REv. 91, 96 n.30 (2018) (citing Cover's Nomos
and Narrativefor "jurisgenerativity"). This is discussed later in the article with only
brief reference toward the end of it. Id. at 112 nn. 118-20.
21 E.g., Robert Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
19

20

Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287 (1982).
22 Kimberlee Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991).
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was revolutionary in the article, the introduction of the nomos, turned
on expressing a kind of sympathy for the discriminatory Bob Jones
University. 23 Its "sympathetic" treatment is directed more at the
Mennonite and Amish briefs in support of Bob Jones University than
at the university itself; however, this sympathy is central to the article's
project. 24 Nomos and Narrative is an article about recognizing
disagreement even as right and justice must be pursued, an approach
perhaps at odds with our times. 25
Moreover, that "sympathy," however indirect, might seem
strange unless one knew that Cover was one of many college students
who trekked south to participate in the civil rights movement,
launching him on a lifelong focus on civil rights and their protection

23 Cover, supra note

1, at 26-29.
Id. at 25-35 (discussing Mennonite and Amish briefs). See also id. at 62
(connecting to Bob Jones University by stating: "The University, in effect, claimed
for itself a nomic insularity that would protect it from general public law prohibiting
racial discrimination.").
25 It should be said that what I am calling "sympathy" for Bob Jones University is
found in a complex argument of Cover's, connected to setting up nomoi's
jurisgenerative capacity but running through much of the article.
Cover's
"sympathy" is expressed in a complicated way. Cover describes part of his project
in Nomos and Narrativeas describing "the ways insular communities establish their
own meanings for constitutional principles through their constant struggle to define
and maintain the independence and authority of their nomos," Cover, supra note 1,
at 25, giving significance to the constitutional principles he assumes Bob Jones
University stands for. Then, in discussing "The Origins of Legal Meaning of
Interpretive Communities," id. at 26, he examines the briefs in support of Bob Jones
University submitted by the Mennonites, id. at 26-29, and Amish, id. at 29-30, and
then argues that these and related groups possess a vision of law rooted in their
nomoi, id. at 30-34. This extended examination is aimed at establishing that sectarian
communities establish their "own meaning for the norms to which it and its members
conform." Id. at 34. Such groups, he then argues, often seek to change the world
through a "redemptive" practice. Id. at 34-35. Garrisonian abolitionism is his
example of these elements. Id. at 35-40. Though Cover is no fan of Bob Jones
University's segregationist position, his extended foray into the creation of legal
meaning demonstrates his belief in taking their views seriously, albeit through the
claims of amici. Eventually, he brings these together by stating that: "The
University, in effect, claimed for itself a nomic insularity that would protect it from
general public law prohibiting racial discrimination." Id. at 62. In ultimately
criticizing the Burger Court's failure to engage the conflict between the
constitutional values of integration and the insular values of Bob Jones University
and "throwing the claims of the protected insularity to the mercy of public policy,"
Cover declares: "The insular communities deserved better." Id. at 67.
24
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in law. 26 That is, there is no doubt about his disapproval of Bob Jones
University's segregationist positions and racist worldview. He had put
his life on the line in opposition to such views. This background
informs his ultimate resolution of the problem exposed by his inversion
of the focus in Nomos and Narrative; if a community has a racist
nomos, it is not enough for the Court to just reject it.27 It should declare
the redemptive constitutional value that requires that rejection,
understanding that what it is doing is destroying that competing
normative vision. At the time that Nomos andNarrativewas written,
the pushback on civil rights legalism was gaining steam and influence
on the Supreme Court. Considering this growing abandonment of
efforts to dismantle vestiges of the Jim Crow era, Cover's complaint
that the Court's support for ending Bob Jones University's tax-exempt
status because of the university's discriminatory behavior was weak
and halfhearted 2 8 takes on added significance, as does his centering of
the jurisgenerative capacity of nomoi that he here nevertheless
sanctions destroying. He understood that a decision in favor of Bob
Jones University would represent a repudiation of the desegregation
project of Brown v. Board of Education2 9 given the "segregation
academies" that had emerged throughout the South.3 0 Therefore, he
wanted more from the Court.
Robert A. Burt, Robert Cover's Passion, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2005)
(discussing Robert Cover's Civil Rights Work and commitment).
27 In ultimately criticizing the Burger Court's failure to engage the conflict between
the constitutional values of integration and the insular values of Bob Jones University
and "throwing the claims of the protected insularity to the mercy of public policy."
Cover, supra note 1, at 67.
28 Cover, supra note 1, at 66. He concludes the article bitterly:
26

[T]he force of the Court's interpretation in Bob Jones University is very
weak. It is weak not because of the form of argument, but because of the

failure of the Court's commitment-a failure that manifests itself in the
designation of authority for the decision. The Court assumes a position
that places nothing at risk and from which the Court makes no interpretive
gesture at all, save the quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional canons:
the statement that an exercise of political authority was not
unconstitutional. The grand national travail against discrimination is given
no normative status in the Court's opinion, save that it means the IRS was
not wrong.

Id.
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Thomas B. Edsall, Abortion Has Never Been Just About Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/15/opinion/abortion2021),
15,
(Sept.
evangelicals-conservatives.html. Indeed, commentators today link the rise of the
anti-abortion movement as a signal issue for conservatives as a way of taking the
30
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Cover's disappointment with the Court's approach perhaps
reflected his recognition of the rapid erosion of the Court's support for
robust implementation of Brown that the opinion represented. Cover's
impatience with the Court's weak approach might seem out of place
since Nomos and Narrative was written when the liberal ideal that
underlays the post-World War II rights regime in both civil and human
rights law was still vital. 3 1 The push-back on civil rights was to be
resisted and perhaps seemed manageable; in any case debates like that
in the Bob Jones case were still about how to address racial
segregation, inequality, and the rights of individuals in the plural
society of 1980s United States. But Cover seems to understand the
implications of the Court's weakness. Despite all this, Nomos and
Narrative is sympathetic to the idea that religious communities like
Bob Jones University might have a different vision of right and the
constitutional order. Sympathy for the Mennonite and Amish positions
in support of Bob Jones University was not too much of a step to take.
But today, after a relentless, more than forty-year streak of successes
for opponents of the civil rights movement, 32 the balance Cover is
trying to strike in the article might seem to give civil rights opponents
too much credit for acting in good faith.
But the analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of Bob Jones
University was never the inspirational part of the article. Rather, many
found in Cover's introduction of the nomos a new, thrilling way of
thinking about the law. 3 3 Legal institutions and rights that had become
anti-desegregation sentiment of white, Christian southerners and directing it toward
a more effective organizing message. Id.
31 See, e.g., LoUIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS xvii (1990) ("Ours is the age of
rights").
32 See, e.g., THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION REvISITED: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON

THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. 3 (Lynda G. Dodd ed.,
2018); SARAH STASZAK, No DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUST AND THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 1, 2-12 (2015).
33 James Grey Pope's summary of Nomos and Narrativeis characteristic:
In his pathbreaking article, Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover argued
that the legal thought and practice of outsiders to the official court system
can be just as important to the study of law as that of insiders. Cover
distinguished jurisprudence, the analytic science of law, from jurisgenesis,
the creation of legal meaning. In contrast to the technical language of
jurisprudence, jurisgenesis thrives on narrative. Legal and popular culture
are linked through storytelling. Cover argued that legal rules and
principles take on meaning by virtue of their location in socially resonant
narratives. Although elites might control the technical discourse of law,
they do not and cannot control the generation of narratives about law. All
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so central to the pursuit of civil rights, equality, and justice, and had
consequently attained a mythic character, were reduced in Nomos and
Narrative to necessary but violent institutions that quashed some
traditions to promote others. Importantly, Cover introduced an
intellectual space to consider the competing traditions of not just
organized religion in the contest over rights, equality, and justice (the
arguably strange part of his sympathy for Bob Jones University), but
of all kinds of communities and groups. 3 4 And, by introducing the
nomoi, he avoided bombastic, corrosive, or slippery concepts like race,
nation, or culture. Since the focus of the article was on the nascent
legal traditions created by nomoi, he also valuably avoided normative
judgments about any particular nomoi. In this way, Nomos and
Narrative inspired one to think of the many ways law emerged, how it
was connected to the dynamic cultural and social processes in any
community, and how those processes might support an alternative way
of thinking about justice. Right and justice was no longer the
monopoly of opaque, indeed mystical, common law traditions or
authoritative and final Supreme Court pronouncements but instead a
part of a vibrant negotiation among social groups of equal standing.
Already in 2005 though, Robert Post noted that the vitality of
Having
Nomos and Narrative had been lost on his students.
introduced the article in a seminar he was teaching on popular
constitutionalism he notes that his "students were virtually indifferent.
They found Nomos and Narrative eloquent, but curious and antique,
informed by a sensibility that seemed distant and indecipherable." 35
Post explains this indifference as rooted in his students' interest in the
state apparatuses that Cover diminishes.
I believe that the [explanation of their indifference] lies
in Cover's belief that "there is a radical dichotomy
Americans share a constitutional text, but we do not share an authoritative
historical account. Even if we did, "we could not share the same account
relating each of us as an individual to that history."

James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 944 (1997).
3 Caleb J. Stevens, Nomos and Nullification: A Coverian View of New York's

Habitual Offender Law, 1926 to 1936, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 427, 428-29 (2019)
("Cover's normative universe is inclusive of not only legal institutions and
prescriptions in well-known sources of law, such as statutes, regulations, and judicial
decisions, but also the narratives that inform how we interpret (or resist) prescriptions
and even inhabit and navigate legal institutions.").
3 Robert C. Post, Who's Afraid of JurispathicCourts?: Violence & Public Reason
in Nomos andNarrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 9, 9 (2005).
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between the social organization of law as power and the
organization of law as meaning." The law that interests
my students, the law of the state, is for Cover merely a
hollow instrument of violence, "itself incapable of
producing the normative meaning that is life and
growth." In Nomos and Narrative the law of the state
carries no republican imprimatur. It is not the result of
citizens working together in public to produce a
government that embodies common civic values.
Composed just before the Republican revival and the
renaissance of Rawlsian public reason, Nomos and
Narrative is strikingly uninterested in the normative
possibilities of constitutional politics. My best guess is
that the students in my seminar could not relate to
Nomos and Narrative because they regarded these
forms of civic engagement as essential to their life's
work. 36
Post's students suggest that Nomos and Narrative had arguably
already attained its peculiar, singular status as an inspirational text that
opened possibility but had lost some of its inspiration.
When I encountered Nomos and Narrative in 1989, I felt the
power and vigor Post attributes to it. Arriving from the rural deep
south where my civil rights attorney father labored under the threat of
violence while he attacked the citadel of law as a protector of
segregation, inequality, and oppression, Cover's perhaps too cynical
view of judges and their justice-achieving capacity rang true, even as
his faith in nomoi to generate alternative visions ofjustice liberated me
from thinking that my view of right, my father's view of justice, was
somehow illegitimate and destined to always be on the margins of the
world I was hoping (as a twenty-two year old law student) to shape.
Before Nomos and NarrativeI knew of law as either a procedural maze
guarding access to substantive principles that somehow supported, or
were at least indifferent to, the segregation that was only being
dismantled (begrudgingly for many) during my youth, or a
countervailing set of inspirational decisions starting with Brown that I
had found faith in, but also saw denigrated as something less than true

36

Id. at 9-10.
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law. 3 7 The article's inspiration was in its opening of possibility for
understanding justice, right, and law.
While Post is likely correct that his 2005 students desired more
about how constitutional politics could shape the world and how
judges might be more than just jurispathic, 3 8 I would venture that much
of what was powerful to me seemed neither novel nor groundbreaking
by 2005, as the recognition of multiple visions of justice in a plural
society has worked its way into other arguments about law and
justice. 39 Like the tantalizing kernel of information on celebrities that
one discovered in an old magazine at an acquaintance's home before
the internet, Nomos and Narrative provided a vision of law and
community that many students like me were starved for. However,
just as celebrity trivia is today readily available on the Internet and
social media, the novelty of Nomos and Narrative is lost in the wave
of writing in intervening years that centers communities and
individuals' experience of their identities in those communities. Is it
not precious, nor is it any longer consigned to be transmitted through
whispers as a treasured insight fortuitously discovered? To some
extent, Nomos and Narrative pointed the way for the intervening
37 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, I am still working to make sense of civil rights law as
something less than law. John Valery White, Civil Rights Law Equity: An
Introduction to a Theory of What Civil Rights Has Become, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REv.

1000 (2022).
38

Post, supra note 35, at 11 ("Although Cover does not explicitly deny the possibility
that judges can create nomos, he does conclude that 'the commitment of judges' is
'to the hierarchical ordering of authority first, and to interpretive integrity only later.'
And he does suggest that 'the commitment to a jurisgenerative process that does not
defer to the violence of administration is the judge's only hope of partially extricating
himself from the violence of the state.' It is of course the very possibility of such
extrication that Cover subsequently denies in Violence and the Word."). See also id.
at 13-14 ("I do not fully understand the emphasis that Cover places on the jurispathic
nature of courts. . . . The problem with courts is not that they are jurispathic, but
rather that they are violent, and it is the connection to the organized violence of the
state that most deeply troubles Cover and leads him to doubt the possibility of a true
statist paideia.").
39 In addition to the focus on identity and the intersectionality of identity that
Crenshaw introduced, recognition has emerged since Cover's death as a significant
way of understanding social justice where "assimilation to majority or dominant
cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect." NANCY FRASER & AXEL
HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL
EXCHANGE 7 (Nancy Fraser & Axel Honneth eds., Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003). See
AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF

SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Joel Anderson trans., 1995).
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scholarship, 4 0 particularly in its characterization of the juridical
process as violent and opposed to nomos-based jurisgenesis, and in its
recognition of the value of narrative to convey competing visions of
justice that might not be recognized by formal judicial processes. But
it neither stands out nor is it necessarily predominant.
What Nomos and Narrative does do, however, is point to
difficult arguments about how rights might be justified in a world
consisting of many nomoi. 4 1 This is what I hope to explore about
Cover's work here. Post sees Nomos and Narrative as envisioning a
sterile state 42 with limited ability to create values that "express the
nomoi of its population." 43 Despite the intense disputes of the post9/11 political order, Post can still conceive of political institutions
much less cynically than Cover. But today, Cover's worry about the
state-which Post commended, stating that "[t]he state's sterility is a
good thing . .. because a government that sought to impose 'a statist
paideia' would be positively dangerous. It would use violence to crush
and displace the autonomous communities where nomos is actually

4 Jack Chin argues that Cover was in effect a Critical Race Theorist, given the nature
of his commitments. Jack Chin, Remarks at the Life and Work of Robert M. Cover
Conference at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (Oct. 4 & 5, 2021).
"4 William Eskridge suggests this reading of Cover. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and CollisionsofLiberty
and Equality in American PublicLaw, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2413 (1997).
42 Post, supra note 35, at 11-12 ("The most to which the state can aspire is what
Cover calls an 'imperial' or 'world maintaining' attitude toward nomoi. The state
can embody 'the universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modern
liberalism,' which are 'essentially system-maintaining weak forces.' In this mode
the state can shelter and protect the communities that produce paideic nomos; it can
pursue 'virtues that are justified by the need to ensure the coexistence of worlds of
strong normative meaning.' But these virtues enact 'an organizing principle itself
incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life and growth."').
as Against Cover, Post is significantly more optimistic about courts and the state:
Much contemporary work in public law begins with a radically different
premise than Nomos and Narrative;it begins with the notion that the state
can express the nomoi of its population, forged through public discussion
and dialogue. It is not afraid of jurispathic courts, because it regards the
judiciary as voicing narratives in which we believe, and it understands all
narratives to be jurispathic. Contemporary public law scholarship
recognizes that reason has limits, that the law of the state inflicts violence,
and that all law ultimately requires commitment. But it regards these facts
as boundary conditions, true in extremis but not descriptive of the
everyday workings of the liberal state.

Id. at 15.
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The rise of populist
forged"44-seems arguably warranted.
nationalism makes the state today potentially the dangerous, nonsterile threat Post described as fortunately neutered. Advocates of such
nationalism increasingly seek to capture the state for the very purpose
of imposing a vision of the nation on the population, rendering some
permanent outsiders where not seeking to exclude some communities
from the "nation" and state.4 5 The dangerous capacity of the state as
violent leveler of identities makes Cover's sterile mediator of nomoi
ever more attractive.
My work here is an attempt to "theorize how [the] plural worlds
[of Cover's nomoi and the nomos of the liberal state] can continue to
co-exist, apart from the 'weak' virtues of a 'system-maintaining'
empire." 46 I believe that Cover's Nomos and Narrative, though
limited by its terms to the relationship between the juridical traditions
of nomoi and the competing tradition of the state, points to how to
manage the growing animosity between competing visions of
nationalism suddenly resurgent in recent years. 4 7 To do so, I hope to
extend the vision of competing nomoi to competing visions of nation
that, unfettered, become "unstable and sectarian in their social
Id. at 11-12.
45 At the extreme are "calls for an end to all immigration and [insistence on] sending
immigrants and their children back to their countries of origin." Norimitsu Onishi,
The Man Behind a Toxic Slogan Promoting White Supremacy, NY TIMEs (Sept. 20,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/world/europe/renaud-camus-great2019),
replacement.html (describing French author Renaud Camus, creator and promotor of
the "great replacement" theory and recounting the platform of the French political
party he formed, "l'Innocence").
46 The concern here is what Post sees at Cover's undertheorizing about the role of the
liberal state:
44

It is possible that Cover's refusal to acknowledge the distinctive nomos of

liberalism follows from a dilemma in which he was ensnared: If liberalism
is its own nomos, and if liberalism is necessary in order to preserve the
small autonomous communities that Cover finds so appealing, then the

nomos of liberalism acquires a special kind of logical priority. But Cover
is unwilling to recognize this priority, because he is concerned to insist

upon plural worlds of equal nomoi. The price of this insistence is that
Cover cannot adequately theorize how these plural worlds can continue to
co-exist, apart from the "weak" virtues of a "system-maintaining" empire.

The potential nomos of liberalism is thus reduced to "an organizing
principle itself incapable of producing the normative meaning that is life
and growth," and courts are concomitantly characterized as merely

"jurispathic."
Post, supra note 35, at 13.
47 See infra Part II.
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organization, dissociative and incoherent in their discourse, wary and
violent in their interactions" 48 and to build on the tools that Cover
articulated to deal with this world: "[t]he sober imperial mode of world
maintenance holds the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning,
imposes the discipline of institutional justice upon norms, and places
the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds cease." 49
II.

ON

POPULIST NATIONALISM

Recent years have seen a proliferation of "populist"
These movements are
movements in western democracies. 50
characterized by anti-globalism, such as in the rejection of the
European Union's transnational governance 5 1 in England's Brexit
vote.52 They also reject a perceived rule by elites at the expense of the
"working man" as evidenced in France's "Gilets Jaunes" movement,5 3
48

Cover, supra note 1, at 16.

49

Id.

50 Andrea Kendall-Taylor & Erica Frantz, How Democracies Fall Apart: Why
Populism Is a Pathway to Autocracy, FOREIGN AFFS. (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-05/how-democracies-fall-apart
(arguing that election of populist parties has replaced coup's as means of
authoritarians coming to power).
Populism is gaining ground. Around the world, economic hardship and
growing unease with globalization, immigration, and the established elite
have propelled such movements into power, leading to a groundswell of
public support for parties and leaders viewed as capable of holding the
forces of cultural and social change at bay.

Id.
" James Bohman, ConstitutionMaking and DemocraticInnovation: The European
Union and TransnationalGovernance, 3 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 315 (2004); Timothy
Garton Ash, It's the Kultur, Stupid, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 7, 2017 (reviewing
Melanie Amann & Finis Germania, ANGST FOR DEUTSCHLAND: DIE WAHRHEIT
OBER DIE AFD: WO SIE HERKOMMT, WER SIE FGHRT, WOHIN SIE STEUERT [ANGST FOR
GERMANY: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AFD: WHERE IT COMES FROM, WHO LEADS IT,
WHERE IT IS HEADED] (2018), and ROLF PETER SIEFERLE, THE END OF GERMANY

(2017)) ("Typical of all European populisms is a negative attitude toward the EU in
general and the euro in particular.").
5 See Matthias Matthijs, The Right Way to Fix the EU: Put Politics Before
Economics,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(May/June
2020),
(linking
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-04-13/right-way-fix-eu
Brexit to concerns with EU).
53 France protests: The Voices of the 'Gilets Jaunes', BBC (Dec. 8, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46480867. The gilets jaunes movement is
cited here because the movement perhaps reflected a populist uprising that was not
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and are consistent with an embrace of authoritarianism, as in the rise
of "populist" parties in support of "strongman" leaders in Poland,
Hungry, and Turkey.54 These movements tend to be anti-immigrant
where they are not simply xenophobic or racist. Naturally, the
"populist" support of President Trump and the related "Trumpism" has
been characterized in these terms,5 5 especially after the January 6th
insurrection. 56 The focus here is on what I am calling "populist
nationalist" movements to distinguish them from populism more
generally, and to highlight that theirs is a particular kind of nationalist

necessarily linked to populist nationalism as discussed here. The movement was a
mass movement, a populist protest, in opposition to the policies of a center-right
government in a country with populist nationalist parties (on the left but especially
the right) but which generally avoided close associations with those parties. See,
e.g., John Lichfield, Just Who Are the Gilets Jaunes?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/09/who-really-are-the-gilets-jaunes
("[M]ixture of supporters explains in part the heterogenous character and demands
of the movement, which point both left and right").
" Turkey, Hungary, and Poland have become exemplars of authoritarian regimes
that have come to power in democratic systems then set to undermining democratic
institutions and the rule of law.
Turkey's political trajectory [under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan] is
an exemplary case of a country permanently rolling back democratizing
reforms, but it's not the only one. Hungary's Viktor Orban and Jaroslaw
Kaczynski's Law and Justice party in Poland are undermining the rule of
law, democratic values, and human rights in the service of what they
define as authenticity and security. These are developments that predate
the migrant crisis that is buffeting Europe, though the large number of

people from Africa and the Middle East seeking refuge in the European
Union has made Orban's and Kaczynski's message more politically
potent, and thus the undoing of democratic institutions and liberal values
politically acceptable, for large numbers of Hungarians and Poles.

Steven A. Cook, Strongmen Die, but Authoritarianism is Forever, FOREIGN POL'Y
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/05/strongmen-die-but2018),
5,
(July
authoritarianism-is-forever.
55 See Foreign Affairs' special edition on populism The Powerof Populism, FOREIGN
AFF'S (Nov./Dec. 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issue-packages/2016-1017/power-populism, especially Fareed Zakaria, Populism on the March: Why the
West
is
in
Trouble,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(Nov./Dec.
2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.corm/articles/united-states/2016-10-17/populism-march
(linking American populism associated with President Trump with populist
movements throughout the West).
56 See, e.g., Zack Beauchamp, Call it Authoritarianism, Vox (June 15, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/6/15/22522504/republicansauthoritarianism-trump-competitive (suggesting that Republican party behavior
since January 6 reflects authoritarianism).
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claim whose anti-pluralist nature and illiberalism is inherent to their
view of the state's obligations to them and their ilk.
The "populism" of many of these movements is a bit of an
As Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric
incongruity, however.
importantly distinguish, there are many manifestations of populism
only some of which would pose conflicts with constitutionalism or
liberalism. 57
They "agree that some variants of populism are
incompatible with modern liberal constitutionalism but argue that the
tension between populism as such and constitutionalism as such,
though real, is significantly narrower than much commentary
suggests." 5 8 David Fontana similarly seeks to distinguish "unbundled"
and "bundled populism." 59 Thus, "[p]opulism generally refers to
arguments pitting a large number of average people unjustly
disempowered relative to and against some power elite." 60 But,
[t]his unbundled version of populism is simply
insufficient to explain our current political moment.
Something else--something more--is happening now
that was not happening previously. Scholars have
therefore bundled into the definition of populism a
number of other criteria. In bundled populism,
antiestablishment views are now also bundled together
with conceptually distinct authoritarian and xenophobic
worldviews. 6 1
Thus, former state department official Fiona Hill argues that populism
is a strongman strategy:
The essence of populism is creating a direct link with
"the people" or with specific groups within a
population, then offering them quick fixes for complex
problems and bypassing or eliminating intermediaries
such as political parties, parliamentary representatives,
5 Mark V. Tushnet & Bojan Bugaric, Populismand Constitutionalism:An Essay on
Definitions and Their Implications (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 20-17, 2020).
58 Id. at 1; see also MARK V. TUSHNET & BOJAN BUGARIC, POWER TO THE PEOPLE:
CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER POPULISM (2021). As Tushnet and Bugaric note, there
are many competing definitions of populism that cast the concept differently, often
loading it with political commitments that other populist movements would not
embrace. Tushnet & Bugaric, supra note 57.
59
David Fontana, UnbundlingPopulism, 65 UCLA L. REv. 1482 (2018).
60

Id. at 1486.

61 Id. at 1494.
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and established institutions. Referendums, plebiscites,
and executive orders are the preferred tools of the
populist leader. .62
She notes that this strategy is deployed effectively in recent years
through use of social media, 63 which she contends has been
weaponized by RussiaM to destabilize western democracies. 65 In any
event, hers is an example of a now popular combination of tenets of
populism with authoritarianism in description of the current threat to
western democracies.
Indeed, the groups and movements advocating what I am
calling populist nationalism are typically plurality movements whose
use of populism is strategic, meant to suggest a "true" segment of the
national population. 66 In this sense, these are "nationalist" movements
which directly and indirectly lay claim to their countries' "true"
identity and argue that this true national identity is being undermined
by foreign forces: generally, the suggestion is that a traitorous elite has
betrayed the true nation in favor of a globalized economy, immigrants,
and other dangerous elements in the country that undermine traditional
62 Fiona Hill, The Kremlin's Strange Victory: How Putin Exploits American
Dysfunction and Fuels American Decline, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2021),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-09-27/kremlins-strangevictory.
63 Id. ("American-made [social media] technology has magnified the impact of once
fringe ideas and subversive actors around the world and become a tool in the hands
of hostile states and criminal groups. Extremists can network and reach audiences as
never before on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which are designed to
attract people's attention and divide them into affinity groups.").
" Id. ("Putin has weaponized this technology against the United States, taking
advantage of the ways that social media undermines social cohesion and erodes
Americans' sense of a shared purpose.").
65

Id. ("Many [democratic U.S. allies], especially in Europe, find themselves in the

same political predicament as the United States, as authoritarian leaders and powers
seek to exploit socioeconomic strife and populist proclivities among their citizens.").
66 Jan-Werner Muller defines populism as "a particular moralistic imagination of
politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully
unified-but, I shall argue, ultimately fictional-people against elites who are
deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior." JAN-WERNER MULLER,
WHAT IS POPULISM? 19-20 (2016). See also William A. Galston, The Populist

Challenge to Liberal Democracy, 29 J.

DEMOCRACY

5, 12 (2018) ("Populism

understands the elite as hopelessly corrupt, the people as uniformly virtuousmeaning that there is no reason why the people should not govern themselves and
their society without institutional restraints. And populist leaders claim that they
alone represent the people, the only legitimate force in society.").
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values. 67 They reject a pluralist vision of nationalism and seek to claim
priority for themselves to the perquisites of their country. 68 The power
of these claims come from the ability of the movements to
commandeer the symbols and legacy of the nation to advance a narrow,
albeit often traditional vision of national identity. 69

67 Comparing German populist nationalism to French and American versions,
Timothy Gardon Ash notes:
Like all contemporary populisms, the German version exhibits both
generic and specific features. In common with other populisms, it
denounces the current elites (Alteliten in AfD-speak) and established
parties (Altparteien) while speaking in the name of the Volk, a word that,
with its double meaning of people and ethno-culturally defined nation,
actually best captures what Trump and Le Pen mean when they say "the
people."

Ash, supra note 51. Ash also notes the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment to
the rise of German populist nationalism:
The dramatic influx of nearly 1.2 million refugees in 2015-2016 is the
single most direct cause of the Alternative's electoral success. Its leaders
denounce Merkel for opening Germany's frontiers in September 2015 to
the massed refugees then being made thoroughly unwelcome in Viktor
Orbin's xenophobic populist Hungary. Following last year's Islamist
terror attack on a Christmas market in Berlin, in which twelve were killed,
one AfD leader tweeted: "these are Merkel's dead."

Id.
Ash is also instructive here; when discussing the strength of German populist
nationalism in the former East Germany, he notes that populist nationalist sense
being ignored while others, typically undeserved immigrants, "get everything," by
which they mean generous welfare benefits. Id. He states poignantly: "In explaining
the populist vote in many countries, the inequality of attention is at least as important
as economic inequality." Id. See also ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN,
68

NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 168 (Pelican,

2018) (populist nationalists assert "a greater right to rewards: consider people who
fought for their nation in wars, or who paid taxes all their lives, compared to someone
who just arrived in the country as an economic immigrant."); id. at 169 ("Large-scale
immigration can ... threaten the unwritten contract between different generations,
whereby people are willing to pay higher taxes for the benefit of those who follow"
but not necessarily new immigrants).
69

Alexander Cooley & Daniel H. Nexon, The Real Crisis of Global Order:

Illiberalism
on
the
Rise,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(Jan./Feb.
2022),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-12-14/illiberalism-real-crisisglobal-order. Arguing the reduction of international economic and social barriers
have facilitated authoritarian, populist nationalist leaders, Alexander Cooley and
Daniel Nexon describe "traditional values and national culture as central to those
regimes' success." Id. The international order, they contend, "now favors a diverse
array of illiberal forces, including authoritarian states, such as China . . ,as well as
reactionary populists and conservative authoritarians who position themselves as
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Authors broadly sympathetic to aspects of the populist
nationalist movement recognize these movements as contests over the
control of the state apparatus in the name of the "nation." For example,
Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin suggest that what they call
"National Populism" is likely to be an enduring movement because it
represents genuine grievances worthy of redress in modern
democracies: "National Populism prioritizes the culture and interests
of the nation, and promises to give voice to a people who feel that they
have been neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often
corrupt elites." 7 0 Though they argue that its "supporters are more
diverse than the stereotypical 'angry old white men,"' 7 1 it is notable
that they take "the nation" as settled in their argument that National
Populist "are part of a growing revolt against mainstream politics and
liberal values." 72
In a statement that seems quaint after the January 6th revolt,
Eatwell and Goodwin argue that the National Populist
challenge to the liberal mainstream is in general not
anti-democratic. Rather, national populists are opposed
to certain aspects of liberal democracy as it has evolved
Contrary to some of the hysterical
in the West.
reactions that greeted Trump and Brexit, those who
support these movements are not fascists who want to
tear down our core political institutions. A small
minority do, but most have understandable concerns
about the fact that these institutions are not
representative of society as a whole and, if anything, are

protectors of so-called traditional values and national culture as they gradually
subvert democratic institutions and the rule of law." Id.
70 EATWELL & GooDwiN, supra note 68, at ix (emphasis added).
71 Id. at x.
72 Id. at xi. In their extended chapter on "destruction," id. at 131-175, Eatwell and
Goodwin argue "that national populism partly reflects deep-rooted public fears about
how a new era of immigration and hyper ethnic change could lead to the destruction
of their wider group and way of life." Id. at 132. Yet, throughout this discussion
they take the "nation" as a set entity contrasted with demographic change. This
passage is typical: Demographic fears flow from a belief that the scale and pace of
immigration put the longer-term survival of the national group at risk, amounting to
intense concern about its possible destruction." Id. at 147.
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cut adrift from the average

citizen.73

Part of what makes their statement quaint after January 6 is the
evident contempt for political processes of majoritarianism reflected
in the "stop the steal" arguments that fueled the January 6 revolt. But
another part is that Eatwell and Goodwin's references to the "average
citizen" in association with their national populists appears to assert
that theirs is the only legitimate national identity and seems to imply
that nation is relatively static, not transforming with demographic,
cultural, and other social change-the "society as a whole" seems to
be tantamount to the national populists they discuss. Consequently,
they seem to suggest that "the people" are ignored in service of others
who are not of the nation without establishing why others are not of
the nation.
Many have expressed concern with these movements and the
cramped vision of national identity they project. So much has this been
the case that some of these commentators have struggled to advance
other ways of thinking about national identity, uncorrupted with the
stain of "nationalism." 7 4 These commentators join a long line of liberal
writers who are uneasy with "nationalism," perhaps due to its vague
similarities with racism and, above all, the use of nationalist rhetoric
in support of the fascist movements of the early twentieth century that
culminated in the Holocaust and the Second World War. 7 5
Nationalism seems inconsistent with pluralistic, liberal democracies,
73 Id. at xi. Generally, Eatwell and Goodwin suggest that national populist
movements are not anti-democratic. They concede that "[s]ome national-populist
leaders, like Hungary's ,Victor Orban, speak of creating a new form of 'illiberal
democracy' that raises worrying issues about democratic rights and the demonization
of immigrants," but they suggest that this is not reflective of larger national populist
movements. Id. See also Galston, supra note 66, at 11 ("[Populism] is skeptical ...
about constitutionalism, insofar as formal, bounded institutions and procedures
impede majorities from working their will. It takes an even dimmer view of liberal
protections for individuals and minority groups.").
74 Patriotism is a popular alternative. See Michael Lind, Jill Lepore Argues for
American Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2019 (reviewing JILL LEPORE, THIS
AMERICA: THE CASE FOR THE NATION (May 28, 2019)).
75 The late Tony Judt summarizes these tendencies among Marxist and liberal

thinkers in the second half of the 20th century. Tony Judt, The New Old Nationalism,
N.Y.
REV.
OF
BOOKS
(May
26,
1994),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1994/05/26/the-new-old-nationalism (reviewing
WALKER

CONNOR,

ETHNONATIONALISM:

(Princeton Univ. Press eds., 1994)).
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given that the advancement of a national identity seems to necessarily
exclude groups within a country that do not share the history,
experience, or perspective of the dominant group. 76
There has been an explosion of writing on "nation" starting
around 1980, proliferating in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet
Union, and remerging with a particular focus on populism in recent
years. Tony Judt summarized Walker Conner's succinct claim that "a
nation is a group of people who entertain a belief in their common
ancestry, what he calls a 'myth of common descent.' It has nothing to
do with a state, which may or may not be a 'nation-state,' although it
usually isn't . . . .77 Hobsbawm's claim that nation is a modernist
development highlights that nation was bound to the state in the
revolutionary period at the end of the 18th century and was largely
undertheorized by writers, like John Stuart Mill, when thinking about
rights and state legitimacy. 78 Generally, nation was viewed as an
archaic concept, expected to be bound into civic pluralism if not
abandoned by liberal individualism. 79 Hobsbawm is among a diverse
76 This kind of distinction between real and unreal citizens made an appearance
recently in the French presidential campaign where center right French presidential
candidate, Valerie P6cresse, embraced the conspiratorial "great replacement" theory,
drawing "a distinction between 'French of the heart' and 'French of papers'-an
expression used by the extreme right to disparage naturalized citizens." Norimitsu
Onishi, In France, a Racist Conspiracy Theory Edges Into the Mainstream, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/world/europe/franceelections-pecresse-great-replacement.html.
77 Judt, supra note 75.
78 HOBSBAWM, supra note 5, at 24 ("[M]uch of the liberal theory of nations emerges
only, as it were, on the margins of the discourse of liberal writers."). See also id. at
14-45.
79 Tony Judt summarizes this sentiment:
In Michael Ignatieffs words, there has been widespread "cosmopolitan
disdain and astonishment" at the ferocity of peoples' demands for their
own nation-state. For a long time, the conventional wisdom was that such

"tribal," ideological allegiances were pass6, at least in Europe. For liberals
and Marxists alike, national attachments and their attendant emotions
made no rational sense in the contemporary world. For liberal scholars the
era of nation-state-making was the necessary prelude to a world of
constitutional states and equal citizens. It therefore made sense that
liberalism and nationalism were intertwined in nineteenth-century

European politics. Traditional liberal thinkers, however, could not
sympathize with the later problem of smaller communities within or
between such states, such as the Slovaks or the Flemish, seeking a
distinctive national and international identity in preference to, and often

instead of, civic equality and democratic rights. Rightly regarding these
demands as a threat to the liberal state, historians and political theorists
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group of theorists writing in the last quarter of the twentieth century
These
that gave serious attention to the concept of nation.
"modernists" tended to view nation (and nationalism) as recent and
novel, developing in conjunction with the nation state and dating, with
the nation state, to no earlier than the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.80
By the end of the twentieth century a "perennialist critique" of this
modernist account had emerged, contending that present day nations
find their origins in the distant past, or at least that the concept of nation
is "a category of human association found everywhere throughout
human history" where particular national identities come and go but
the form persists. 8 1 Whether nation is either the social construct of the
modernist or a construct conditioned by the real historical references
or inherent human associations of the perennialist, the content of any
particular nation is not set. For any given nation, its content is
contested, however much the detail of that content might be
circumscribed by the finite set of historical, linguistic, and mythic
The community of
commitments of a particular community.
communities of the nation state contains diverse, overlapping, and
divergent contributors to the idea of nation.82 These communities are
not unlike Cover's nomoi, suggesting that the terrain of competing
nomoi that Cover suggests 83 is, like any vision of the nation itself in a
particular state, critical to the formation of the nation once we cease
thinking of nation as a set, inherited identity for any given nation state.
Recently, a liberal communitarian case for the nation has
proliferated.84 Liberal communitarians emphasize the importance of

grew unsympathetic to nationalism, treating its presence as a pathological
condition of incomplete "modernity."

Judt, supra note 75.
80

See ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE NATION IN HISTORY, HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES

ABOUT ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 27-34 (Univ. Press of New England eds.,

2000).
81
Id. at 34-35 (describing theory of "recurrentperennialism"). See also id. at 36-51.
82

See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM: THEORY, IDEOLOGY, AND HISTORY 20-23

(Polity Press eds., 2d ed. 2010) (arguing that it is possible to distinguish these kinds
of identity from national and other collective identities and thus recognize a concept
like nation that is dynamic but still coherent enough to analyze).
83 Cf Cover, supra note 1, at 16 ("It is the problem of the multiplicity of meaningthe fact that never only one but always many worlds are created by the too fertile
forces of jurisgenesis.").
I See Alan Ryan, Whose Nationalism?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 26, 2020
(reviewing AMITAI ETZIONI, RECLAIMING PATRIOTISM (2019), YAEL TAMIR, WHY
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nationalism even as they seek to situate it in the liberal tradition. What
Amitai Etzioni seeks to exalt is a form of patriotism that respects
individual rights, without those rights acting as trump cards when they
come into conflict with the public interest. 8 5 Necessarily, these authors
take up the challenge suggested by numerous nomoi competing to
influence or set a national identity. As Alan Ryan suggests in his
assessment of liberal communitarianism of Yael Tamir and Etzioni,
they have done so with only limited success in the face of populist
nationalism.86
The difficulty for both Tamir and Etzioni is that nationalism in
practice, both in the United States and in Europe, has recently tended
to be xenophobic, illiberal, and a version of the "ethnonationalism"
described by Liah Greenfeld. 87 Since both Etzioni and Tamir want a
liberal nationalism, one reasonably expects to see a proposal or two for
securing it that has some chance of success. Etzioni looks for
compromise between a rights-based individualism and a communal
search for the common good, 88 but it is not obvious that the enthusiasts
for making America great again have any interest in the rights of
anyone other than themselves. The moral conversations on which he
relies seem all too likely to become shouting matches. It is only fair to
acknowledge that he recognizes this, but then we are left with nothing
much beyond the hope that members of a fractious public will recover
a willingness to listen attentively to one another.
Tamir takes a different tack by looking to economic remedies
for the sense of alienation felt by the so-called left behind. 89 However,
it is not clear that Make American Great Again ("M.A.G.A.") foot
soldiers will find economic remedies satisfactory, so much as their
view is about grievance against others and seems to require
vanquishing of those they believe are unjustly part of their America.
That is, finding a way to resolve the conflict between competing ideas
of nation seems unavoidable yet difficult.
Early liberal unease with nation seems to have been rooted in
the now largely abandoned view that nation was static and bound with

NATIONALISM

(2019)).

85 See id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.

(2019), and LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM:

A SHORT STORY
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the state, 90 according to which notions of national identity were
rightfully to be guided by those in control of the government, 9 1 subject
to a limit on advancing identities wholly inconsistent with some
fundamental national ideal. 92 That is, government leaders get to say
what the "nation" is, even as their vison of nation must comport with
a broader, accepted vision of nation. 9 3 Though such a view of national
character promised to ensure individual equality for citizens, it also
seems to support authoritarianism and justify suppression of dissident
views to the extent that dissident individuals and groups rejected the
nation and state that governed them. 9 4 The increasing recognition of
nation as an extant, legitimate, and perhaps necessary part of the
identity of citizens of the nation state has prompted a difficult
90 HOBSBAWM, supra note 5, at 20 (arguing that in the revolutionary period, nation
is equivalent to government because for the revolutionaries in France at least, nation
was equivalent to citizen); SMITH, supra note 80, at 17 ("Too often, theorists see the
state as dominant, with the nation as a kind of junior partner or qualifying adjective.
Little attention is then given to the dynamics of the nation.").
91 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES, REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2006).

This is the fundamental observation of Benedict Anderson, who argues that nation
is a creation of elites to bind together a people, typically drawing on a common
vernacular language and piecing together a tradition from shared references.
Anderson notes that government leaders adopted this approach to nation formation
to consolidate and preserve their authority. See id. at 83-113. See also SMITH, supra
note 80, at 11 discussing ERNEST RENAN, QU'EST-CE QU'UNE NATION? (CalmannLevy eds., 1882) and his political definition of the nation. "But politics is not enough.
The state as such cannot function as a social cement or a bond between its citizens.
For Renan, that can be provided only by 'history,' or rather by historical memories
and the 'cult of the ancestors."' Id.
93 Judt, supra note 75 ("Nationalist intellectuals may well invent a tradition, but they
cannot invent just any tradition-it must fit within some recognizable continuum of
distinctive local features.").
94 This is especially the case for ethnocultural nationalism, which might be said to
92

subordinate[] individual and collective liberties to the demand of cultural
homogeneity and national unity. It is not concerned with the liberties and
prosperity of the citizens in a well-ordered, law abiding republic, nor does
Nationalism's
it engender a caring compassion for fellow-citizens.
overriding concern with unity and homogeneity inevitably breeds and
exclusive and narrow love of the nation.

SMITH, supra note 80, at 17. But Smith notes that an apparently attractive distinction
between ethnocultural nationalism and civic nationalism is not as sharp as one might
believe. The distinction between civic and cultural nationalism, he argues, assumes
"a secular trend from ethnic toward civic nationalism, with cultural nationalism as a
kind of halfway house along the road. But the evidence for such a trend, even in the
West, is dubious." Id. at 19. See generally id. at 5-25.
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challenge: how to manage disagreement over what the nation is or
ought to be. This is what the liberal communitarians have taken up
and it seems critical to the preservation of liberal pluralism. Recent
events have forced us to recognize developments that were apparent
twenty-five years ago, already:
For many people today, nationalism tells the most
convincing story about their condition-more realistic
than socialism, more immediately reassuring than
liberalism. One reason for this is that nationalists
acknowledge, indeed thrive upon, the apparent
incompatibility of competing claims and values. They
make a political virtue out of what, for many desperate
peoples, may seem to be an existential necessity. If we
wish to counter such views we have to begin by
acknowledging that they contain a kernel of truth.
There are incommensurate goals and unresolvable
problems, and the unequal and conflicted division of
the world into nations and peoples is not about to wither
and shrivel or be overcome by goodwill or progress.
The revolutions of 1789 and 1917 were born of the
benevolent illusion that such untidy and unpleasing
features of our world are transient and of secondary
importance in the great scheme of things. The
revolutions of 1989 and their aftermath offer a timely
opportunity to think again. 95
Following Judt, it seems necessary that we resolve not just how
communities with different national visions might be brought together
in the increasingly fragile nation state, but how the liberal nation state
might contend with the national vision of specifically illiberal groups.
It is not accidental that populist nationalists seek to capture the
state and deploy it in service of a cultural mission, 96 typically restoring
a supposedly lost era on which their nationalist vision is based. 97
95 Judt, supra note 75.

96 Sometimes this mission is expressly racist, such as arguments aimed at resisting
the "great replacement" articulated in conspiracy theories. See Onishi, supra note
45.
97 Galston, supra note 66, at 8-9 ("Many citizens, their confidence in the future
shaken, long instead for an imagined past that insurgent politicians have promised to
restore. As popular demand for strong leaders grows, rising political actors are
beginning to question key liberal-democratic principles such as the rule of law,
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Cover seems to anticipate just this kind of view within nomoi. "People
associate not only to transform themselves, but also to change the
social world in which they live. Associations, then, are a sword as well
as a shield. They include collective attempts . . . to change the law or
the understanding of the law." 9 8 Nomoi are in an unsteady state
between seeking control and accommodating to the lack of control.

So,
[a]lthough [nomoi have] a place in their normative
worlds for civil authority, and although some would
transform civil authority into an intolerant arm of their
own substantive vision when the chance arose, all,
finding themselves within a state not under their
control, [seek] refuge not simply from persecution, but
for associational self-realization in nomian terms. 99
With this understanding, Cover envisions what we would today think
of as progressive activism in a description meant to imply the fight
against segregation but its structure might be taken as a description of
illiberal populist nationalists.
[A] transforming association has its own vision, which
it fits together with its conception of reality and its
norms to create an integrated whole. The discontinuities
between the respective visions, constructions of reality,
and norms posited by some such associations and by the
state's authoritative legal institutions may be
shall
use
"redemptive
considerable.
I
constitutionalism" as a label for the positions of
associations whose sharply different visions of the
social order require a transformational politics that
cannot be contained within the autonomous insularity
of the association itself. 10
Populist nationalist can thus be seen as nomoi, whose sharply different
vision of the social order requires transformational politics, except
their politics are almost expressly at the expense of others who they
define outside of the rightful political community.
freedom of the press, and minority rights. The door seems to be opening for a return
to forms of authoritarianism written off by many as relics of the past.").
98
99

Cover, supra note 1, at 33-34.

Id. at 31.
10 Id. at 34.
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At stake for populist nationalist is the loss of a tradition
connecting their community to greatness and by extension, a loss of
greatness in the present. In this structure, alternative visions of the
nation, but particularly pluralistic visions that imagine incorporation
of other communities into the national identity, are treasonous. 101
Again, Eatwell and Goodwin are instructive. Before conceding that
"some national populists veer into racism and xenophobia, especially
toward Muslims" 10 2 they list "legitimate democratic issues" 10 3 that
their nationalist populist raise, including the capacity of western
democracies to "rapidly absorb rates of immigration and 'hyper ethnic
change,'" 10 4 which they regard as unprecedented, the creation of
highly unequal societies and whether "the state should not accord
priority in employment and welfare" for certain people, and "whether
all religions support key aspects of modern life in the West," such as
women's and L.G.B.T.Q. rights. 105 The nature of liberalism suggests,
of course, that debate about these issues is legitimate and fair. But the
claims of Eatwell and Goodwin suggest something different-that the
grievances of national populists deserve to be the policy of the state,
despite how "liberal democracy as it has evolved in the West" 106 and
101 The "great replacement" is in France conceived expressly as a counter to
multiculturalism, see Onishi, supra note 45 and, more recently "wokisme." Onishi,
supra note 76.
102 EATWELL & GOODWIN, supra note 68, at xii.
103
Id. They go on in full:
[National Populists] question the way in which elites have become more
and more insulated from the lives and concerns of ordinary people. They

question the erosion of the nation state, which they see as the only
construct that has proven capable of organizing our political and social

lives. They question the capacity of Western societies to rapidly absorb
rates of immigration and "hyper ethnic change" that are largely
unprecedented in the history of modern civilization. They question why
the West's current economic settlement is creating highly unequal

societies and leaving swathes of people behind, and whether a state should
accord priority in employment and welfare to people who have spent their
lives paying into the national pot. They question cosmopolitan and

globalizing agendas, asking where these are taking us and what kind of
societies they will create. And some of them ask whether all religious
support key aspects of modern live in the West, such as equality and
respect for women and LGBT communities....

Id.

104 Id.
105

Id.

X06 Id. at xi. See also id. at xi-xii ("[M]ost national-populist want more democracymore referendums and more empathetic and listening politicians that give more
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the objections of others in the state, particularly those who view such
positions as xenophobic, chauvinistic, racist, 107 and even antidemocratic represent hysterical responses to these movements. 108
All populist nationalists are illiberal in that they claim, in the
name of "the people," that the state ought to operate primarily or
exclusively in the interest of some citizens. That is, the "nationalist"
views common to populist nationalism seek to exclude. They claim
that some citizens in their country are not real members. 109 Generally,
they accept that the elite they despise are members of their national
identity but see them as betrayers of that nationalism.' 1 0 However,
many citizens are not "true" citizens." The exclusion of large swaths
of the polity from legitimate standing in the community is not new;
indeed, domestic and international law has anticipated this troubling
aspect of nationalism and worked to provide protection for
"minorities" of various types within nation states." 2 In the face of the
rise of robust "populist nationalist" movements and the demands they
place on political leaders, it is useful to see how Cover would deal with
competing nomoi before turning to how rights-talk conceives of
nationalism and the role of minorities within national communities.

power to the people and less power to established economic and political elites. This
'direct' conception of democracy differs from the 'liberal' one that has flourished
across the West .... ").
107 Eatwell and Goodwin complain that "Although most national populist in Europe
do not hold office . . . [t]hey are dismissed as extremists whose authoritarian and
racist policies pose a serious threat to liberal democracy and minorities." Id. at xvxvi.
108 See, e.g., id. at xi ("Contrary to some of the hysterical reactions that greeted Trump
and Brexit, those who support these movements are not fascists who want to tear
down our political institutions.").
109 Id. at 47 ("right wing populists stress the need to limit immigration and preserve
national identity").
"0 For example, Eatwell and Goodwin point to Marie Le Pen's argument that elites'
support of globalization sets the conditions for "Islamic fundamentalism" and that
hers are not uncommon views. Id. at 71.
" This is the import of the French far right's distinction between the French of heart
and French of papers. See Onishi, supra note 76.
112 See infra Part IV.C.2. for a discussion of the League of Nations Minorities system.
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DOES NoMoS AND NARRATIVE SUPPORT POPULIST
NATIONALISM?

In one sense Nomos and Narrative seems to point us toward
conceding ground to populist nationalist without really indicating how
to respond to the presence of illiberal nationalism. The signal
innovation of the article is its focus on the nomos and its
jurisgenerative power. From this perspective, Nomos and Narrative
seems to suggest embracing the nomos of populist nationalism. And
when the article ultimately focuses on the Bob Jones University case,
it seems to abandon the carefully constructed respect for nomoi, to
demand the Supreme Court be clearer in its decision making, that it
embrace the redemptive constitutionalism that led to the difficult
dispute in the first place. That resolution points us away from the
difficult question of mediating conflict between nomoi and seems to
offer little that would help address the problem of nation as conceived
by the liberal communitarians. Ultimately, however, Nomos and
Narrative does offer a framework for addressing the conflict between
nomoi that might help us manage the growing conflict with illiberal
populist nationalism." 3
A.

The Centrality of Cover's Sympathy in Nomos and
Narrative

In Nomos and Narrative, Cover underscored that the
segregationists at Bob Jones University and others with discriminatory
religious beliefs might live in a normative universe that generated
notions of right and justice that would be at odds with those extant in
the federal government, that they might read the same constitution
differently." 4 In a statement that echoes his position in Violence and

113 See Cover, supra note 1, at 40-53, 60-61.
See id. at 46 ("In Part II, I wrote of the proliferation of legal meaning-the
impossibility and undesirability of suppressing the jurisgenerative principle, the legal
DNA. I have suggested that the proliferation of legal meaning is at odds, however,
with the effort of every state to exercise strict superintendence over the articulation
of law as a means of social control. Commitment, as a constitutive element of legal
meaning, creates inevitable conflict between the state and the processes of
jurisgenesis.").
114
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the Word,1 5 Cover begins from the view that deciding against these
communities was an act of destruction. Nomos and Narrative has
inspired many who hold progressive views because it offers a broader
way of thinking about law and community in which communities can
affirm their vision of justice even if not (currently) recognized by law.
However, Cover's "sympathy" for Bob Jones University,
expressed indirectly through sympathy for the Mennonite and Amish
briefs in support of Bob Jones University, is not incidental to his
article. Cover laments at one point that the reader had likely tired of
his "insistence upon dignifying the internal norms, redemptive
fantasies, briefs, positions, or arguments of various groups with the
word 'law"' 1 6 for by then he had devoted some twenty pages to that
project. Though he does not condone Bob Jones University's racism,
Cover's treatment of their position as rooted in sincere belief and
related to more defensible concerns in the Mennonite and Amish briefs
is a tacit recognition that neither Brown, the Supreme Court's
increasingly aggressive enforcement efforts of the late 1960s and early

15 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
116

Cover, supra note 1, at 40.
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1970s, 117 nor the civil rights legislation of the civil rights era"1 8 had
magically eliminated segregationist sentiment. However much the
signaling function of Supreme Court opinions might have pushed some
to change their views, many who believed in segregation still believed
in it more than twenty-five years after Brown. But in the structure of
the article, Cover's "sympathy" for Bob Jones University is meant to
do more than just acknowledge this fact. It is a recognition of Bob
Jones University's right to have its view, 119 even if Cover believed that
the Court should not affirm those views. 120
The ramping up of enforcement of Brown is reflected in the Supreme Court's selfconscious description of its efforts in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District, where it furthered that more aggressive view in 1971:
117

By the time the Court considered Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.

430, in 1968, very little progress had been made in many areas where dual
school systems had historically been maintained by operation of state
laws. In Green, the Court was confronted with a record of a freedom-ofchoice program that the District Court had found to operate in fact to
preserve a dual system more than a decade after Brown I. While

acknowledging that a freedom-of-choice concept could be a valid
remedial measure in some circumstances, its failure to be effective in
Green required that:

"The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work now until it is clear that state-imposed
segregation has been completely removed"

This was plain language, yet the 1969 Term of Court brought fresh
evidence of the dilatory tactics of many school authorities. Alexander v.
Holmes County Boardof Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), restated the basic

obligation asserted in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 234
(1964), and Green, that the remedy must be implemented forthwith.
The problems encountered by the district courts and courts of appeals
make plain that we should now try to amplify guidelines, however
incomplete and imperfect, for the assistance of school authorities and
courts.

402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971).
118 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); 52 U.S.C. § 10301; Fair
Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
119 Cover, supra note 1, at 62 ("The University, in effect, claimed for itself a nomic
insularity that would protect it from general public law prohibiting racial
discrimination.").
120
Id. at 66 ("Precisely because the school is the point of entry to the paideic and the
locus of its creation, the school must be the target of any redemptive constitutional
ideology.").
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The Bob Jones University litigation presented what seemed a
simple question of whether government support, through tax
exemptions, ought to be extended to a university with racially
discriminatory policies.1 2 1 Behind this narrow question was a broader
but still straightforward issue of whether opponents of Brown would
be allowed to circumvent its call for integration. In response to Brown
and as a legacy of the massive resistance movement, white southerners
created private "academies" to permit their children to continue to
attend segregated schools.1 22 Many of these schools conceived of
themselves as Christian academies.1 23 Bob Jones University, though
not a secondary school, shared these school's efforts to root their
segregation desires in religious belief. Simultaneously, given the
American tradition of deference to religious belief, many in the South
had sought to justify segregation as a part of their religious beliefs. 124
In response, courts rejected these religious arguments for
discrimination and the Court, increasingly frustrated with the slow
pace of desegregation of schools had, for a while, rejected various
privatization efforts aimed at continuing public support for private
education.12 5 Though the momentum behind aggressive enforcement
of Brown was fading by the time the Bob Jones University controversy
emerged, it was very much of a piece with these efforts to confront
segregation academies and the privatization of public goods to avoid
desegregating them.
Nomos and Narrative is an exercise in demonstrating that the
question in the Bob Jones University litigation is a difficult one,
particularly if one took seriously people's competing vision of right
and justice. Nomos and Narrative focuses very much on the law-

121 Id. at 62.
122 See Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441
(1973).
23 See, e.g., Ashton Pittman, Mississippi's 'Seg Academies' Creating National
Dialogue,
JACKSON
FREE
PRESS
(Dec.
21,
2018),
https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2018/dec/21/mississippis-seg-academiescreating-national-dialo/ ("Segregation academies, which claimed to be Christian
from their outset, have also long provided limited information on scientific concepts
such as evolution, the reason for southern secession into the Civil War (slavery) and
the full range of American history.").
124 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1983).
121 See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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making elements of communities, 126 apropos for introducing how a
religious community's racial discrimination ran afoul of Brown's
developing (or fading) anti-discrimination norms. Cover chides the
Court for cowardice; rather than declaring a "redemptive" value, rather
than defending and extending Brown, the Court avoided what was
difficult in the case. 12 7 However, the article really does not tell us how
the Court should have gone about reaching that decision. It tells us
that Bob Jones University had a view of the world we should recognize
(and perhaps respect), even if we found the view repellent and had no
intention on embracing its view as constitutional law. But the failure
to tell us exactly when a court should invoke redemptive values over
deference to the jurisgenerative capacity of nomoi proves troubling
today with a reactionary Supreme Court and advancing populist
nationalist movements afoot.
E.g., Cover, supra note 1, at 44 ("In the normative universe, legal meaning is
created by simultaneous engagement and disengagement, identification and
objectification. Because the nomos is but the process of human action stretched
between vision and reality, a legal interpretation cannot be valid if no one is prepared
to live by it.").
126

127

Cover observed:
[T]he force of the Court's interpretation in Bob Jones University is very
weak. It is weak not because of the form of argument, but because of the
failure of the Court's commitment-a failure that manifests itself in the
designation of authority for the decision. The Court assumes a position
that places nothing at risk and from which the Court makes no interpretive
gesture at all, save the quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional canons:

the statement

that an

exercise

of political

authority

was not

unconstitutional. The grand national travail against discrimination is given
no normative status in the Court's opinion, save that it means the IRS was
not wrong.

Id. at 66. Rather than declaring a "redemptive" constitutional principle-upholding
Brown's antidiscrimination principle and declaring the Congress cannot
constitutionally grant tax exemptions to discriminatory institutions-the Court
upholds the IRS's policy judgment. Cover is disappointed that all the actors in the
saga lack "commitment."
Bob Jones University seemed uncommitted and lackadaisical in its
racist interpretation-unwilling to put much on the line. The IRS
ruling was left shamefully undefended by an administration
unwilling to put anything on the line for the redemptive principle.
The Justices responded in kind: they were unwilling to venture
commitment of themselves, to make a firm promise and to project
their understanding of the law onto the future. Bob Jones
University is a play for 1983-wary and cautious actors, some
eloquence, but no commitment.
Id. at 67.
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Illiberal Nomoi

The successors of the Bob Jones University position have
reemerged under the banner of populism. In an organized political
rebellion against globalism, liberalism, and perhaps even
representative democracy, some Americans have increasingly
redefined much of the contemporary American legacy in terms that are
chauvinistic, nativistic, and patriarchal 1 28-and often racist. Studies
of these Americans highlight high degrees of racial animosity,
particularly directed at black Americans, as a defining feature of this
populist nationalism. In the view of some, this movement is directly
tied to the Bob Jones University litigation and the demise of
segregation academies which linked segregation thinking with a view
of Christian fundamentalism. 12 9 Globally, what has come to be called
populism represents a vision of nationalism that is constructed in
contrast to globalism, the economic system of liberalized trade and
interconnected economies, but also in contrast to the system of liberal
rights in domestic and international law and which support plural
democratic societies. The populist nationalist movements' similarity
to the nomoi of Nomos and Narrativeis implied in Cover's definition
of "[a] nomos [as] a present world constituted by a system of tension
between reality and vision."1 30 The movements are paideic in that we
are observing a common body of precept and narrative promoted
through social media and more traditional avenues to generate a
community dedicated to claiming a central place in an anti-pluralist
society.1 3 1 They aspire to an imperial function also as their goal is to

128 This is the import of David Barton's books, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION and THE JEFFERSON LIES, where Barton advances the

"forgotten history" that the United States was founded to be a Christian country run
on Christian principles. See Tara I. Burton, Understanding the Fake Historian
Behind America's Religious Right, Vox (Jan. 25, 2018, 12:00PM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/1/25/16919362/understanding-the-fakehistorian-behind-americas-religious-right.
129 See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 30 (discussing KATHERINE STEWART, THE POWER
WORSHIPPERS:

INSIDE

THE

DANGEROUS

RISE

OF

RELIGIOUS

NATIONALISM

(Bloomberg 2020)).
30 Cover, supra note 1, at 9.
131 Id. at 12-13 ("[There are] two corresponding ideal-typical patterns for combining
corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment to form a nomos. The first such
pattern, ... is world-creating, I shall call 'paideic,' because the term suggests: (1) a
common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being
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"reclaim" control of government and cultural institutions impose their
"true" vision of nation on the community.13 2 Supporters of this
populism often support authoritarianism, which is seen as necessary to
defend the true citizens of the country from both betrayal by disloyal
elites and incursions by foreigners, both immigrants and "foreign"
residents of the country. They also link their national ideal to specific
religions that are seen as natural to the nation. 13 3 Both domestically
and internationally, this populist nationalism has eschewed the narrow
constitutional question (can the IRS do this or that in support of Brown)
for the broader inquiry over what the nation is. But the answer to what
is the nation both begets answers to specific constitutional questions
and informs a broader interpretative frame for understanding
constitutional and statutory questions.
Given the respect for competing nomoi that is central to Nomos
andNarrativeand the article's lack of direction on how to decide when
to embrace one nomos over another in constitutional disputes, could it
be that Nomos and Narrativesupports these illiberal developments of
recent years that seem antithetical to Cover's life work? Or perhaps it
just envisions a world where populist nationalist might capture the
educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as
the individual and his community work out the implications of their law.").
132 Id. at 13 ("The second ideal-typical pattern, which finds its fullest expression in
the civil community, is 'world maintaining.' I shall call it 'imperial.' In this model,
norms are universal and enforced by institutions. They need not be taught at all, as
long as they are effective.").
13 Kenneth Townsend captures these sentiments:
Liberalism is in decline in the West. Past political divides that pitted
classically liberal conservatives against moderate to progressive political
liberals are giving way to a new landscape in which a liberal consensus
simply cannot be assumed. From the left, socialist and identity-based
critiques of liberalism have called into question core liberal assumptions
regarding procedural justice, the division between public and private
realms, and the rights of individuals. From the right, an increasingly vocal
group of conservatives is questioning classical liberalism's commitment
to limited government, a free market, and individual rights in favor of a

vision of political community where the state advances certain religious,
traditional, or nationalist views.

Kenneth L. Townsend, Why Liberalism Persists: The Neglected Life of the Law in
the Story of Liberalism's Decline, 94 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 457, 457 n.2 (2020) (citing
PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2019); Sohrab Ahmari et al., Against
the
Dead
Consensus,
FIRST
THINGS
(Mar.
21,
2019),
https://www.flrstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/03/against-the-dead-consensus;
Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy)).
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state apparatuses and rightfully impose their illiberal view on others.
Indeed, since Nomos and Narrative argues that "the proliferation of
legal meaning is at odds, . . . with the effort of every state to exercise
strict superintendence over the articulation of law as a means of social
control," 134 one might assume that Nomos and Narrativesupports the
state articulating a national ideal either through fiat or by just choosing
Cover acknowledges that the close
one narrative over others.
relationship between the state's claims over legal meaning and
imperfect monopoly over the domain of violence makes resistance
often unpalatable, with the consequence that "[o]ur overriding
temptation in the absence of substantial, direct, and immediate violent
resistance to official law is to concede the state's principal claim to
interpretation and to release the jurisgenerative processes of
associations, communities, and movements to a delegated, secondary,
or interstitial status."' 35
Do these observations suggest that the battle over nation ought
to be fought for control over government apparatus with the loser
conceding that government has had a traditional, nonexclusive role in
defining nation and permit the winner to implement its national
vision? 36
I think not.
Still, the change of focus from discrete
constitutional questions to an unbounded inquiry into what the nation
is leaves some doubt on this issue. Cover's Nomos and Narrativeonly
addressed the former where the constitutional text, precedent, and
judicial tradition provide limits on the kinds of juridical traditions that
can be effectively translated from nomoi to judicial interpretation
through the bridge of narrative. 137 Given the quite different nature of
Cover, supra note 1, at 46.
Id. at 52.
136 This is perhaps why Paul Kahn sees Cover's constitutionalism as anarchistic. See
Paul W. Kahn, Community in ContemporaryConstitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1,
55 (1989).
137 Cover, supra note 1, at 16 ("In the world of the modern nation-state - at least in
the United States-the social organization of legal precept has approximated the
imperial ideal type that I have sketched above, while the social organization of the
narratives that imbue those precepts with rich significance has approximated the
paideic."). Consequently,
134
13

[t]he precepts we call law are marked off by social control over their
provenance, their mode of articulation, and their effects. But the narratives
that create and reveal the patterns of commitment, resistance, and
understanding-patterns that constitute the dynamic between precept and
material universe-are radically uncontrolled. They are subject to no
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the question presented by competing visions of nation, alongside the
significant, illiberal implications of adopting the populist nationalists'
vision of nation, much weight is placed on Cover's imperial role of
judges and how they should deal with the competing juridical
interpretations of nomoi. There Cover suggests a mediating role for
the state, but a limited one dedicated to a particular approach.
C.

Regulating Nomoi and Promoting Jurisgenesis

Cover partially addresses the state's role in contending with
competing nomoi by suggesting that the role of judges should be
circumscribed by leaving most substantive issues to the private
sphere. 138 Building on Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v.
California,139 where Brandeis
would have attacked the problem of the law's violence
by constitutionalizing the principles of an uncoerced
politics, a free public space, which would generate a
law legitimated even in its coercive dimensions by its
uncoerced origins. Free speech was to be the linchpin
of this legitimation-free speech conceived of as all the
components of deliberative public life. 140
But Cover recognizes that this solution is not entirely successful
because modern "American political life no longer occurs within a
public space dominated by common mythologies and rites and
occupied by neighbors and kin." 14 1 Without a shared national ethos,
law's violence cannot be mitigated, suggesting that efforts to impose a
national identity would produce more difficult questions, thus resulting
formal hierarchical ordering, no centralized, authoritative provenance, no
necessary pattern of acquiescence. Such is the radical message of the first
amendment: an interdependent system of obligation may be enforced, but
the very patterns of meaning that give rise to effective or ineffective social

control are to be left to the domain of Babel.
Id. at 17. That is, meaning is left to the private realm. This is where nation is
constructed, debated, and modified. However, our current battle over nation seeks
to make it distinctly public, formal, and subject to the imperial ideal type.
13
8 Id. at 44-60.
139 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Robert Cover,
The Left, the Right, and the FirstAmendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REv. 349, 38587 (1981).
141 Cover, supra note 1, at 48.
141
d. at 49.
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in judicial violence that was more lamentable as it was more
significant.
It seems that for Cover, the hollowing out of shared national
identities makes nomoi more central to developing meaning in the
shared community. If the formal institutions of state cannot produce a
truly shared nomos, the violence of courts' jurispathic character is
magnified and there is ever more reason to defer to nomoi where real
meaning in a shared community can be formed. As such, we should
note that these very communities seem to be in decline, presently. 142
Community creation could be viewed as increasingly virtual. While it
is unclear whether virtual communities have the depth of commitment
to be nomoi, it seems that populist nationalism has been facilitated by
social media, permitting access to precept and narrative, education in
its tenets, and development of its meaning though crowd-sourced
engagement. And if a virtual populist nationalism is a nomos in a time
when the state's ability to develop a nomos is undermined and its
violence is therefore magnified, then can the state just leave nation
formation to the private sphere? Perhaps Cover anticipated a version
of this problem in his reluctant rejection of Brandeis' solution.
Cover's larger solution to the problem of contested meaning
from nomoi is found in his review of challenges to school curricula:
The weakness of the state's claim to authority for its
formal [umpiring] between visions of the good is
evidenced by the state's willingness to abdicate the
project of elaborating meaning. The public curriculum
is an embarrassment, for it stands the state at the heart
of the paideic enterprise and creates a statist basis for
the meaning as well as for the stipulations of law. The
recognition of this dilemma has led to the second
dimension of constitutional precedent regarding
schooling-a breathtaking acknowledgment of the
privilege of insular autonomy for all sorts of groups and
associations.... [T]here must, in sum, be limits to the
142 ROBERT PUTNAM BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN

COMMUNITY 107-08 (2000) (noting a loss of informal social interaction); see, e.g.,
Sarah P. Bailey, Church Membership in the U.S. Has FallenBelow the Majorityfor
the First Time In Nearly a Century, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2021, 6:03 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/03/29/church-membership-fallenbelow-majority (showing surveys that reflect a sharp decline in religious affiliation
and the related community created by church attendance).
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state's prerogative to provide interpretive meaning
when it exercises its educative function. But the
exercise is itself troublesome; thus, the private, insular
alternative is specially protected. Any alternative to
these limits would invite a total crushing of the
jurisgenerative character. The state might become
committed to its own meaning and destroy the personal
and educative bond that is the germ of meanings
alternative to those of the power wielders. 143
Cover seeks to limit the jurispathic capacity of judges, going beyond
judges' own resort to jurisdiction to deflect and obscure their
by committing them to privatizing many
jurispathic tendencies,'
of education, limiting the state's role in
the
realm
disputes and, in
umpiring between visions of good by specifically limiting the state's
prerogative to provide interpretive meaning.
We might extract from this approach a response to disputes
over the nature and content of the nation with two parts. First, the state
should avoid deciding the content of the national identity, relegating
such debates to the private sphere, limiting its umpiring between
conceptions of the nation, and limiting its prerogative to provide
interpretive meaning in defining the nation itself. Second, these efforts
should be guided by Cover's emphasis on facilitating the
jurisgenerative capacity of nomoi. Cover emphasizes a role for courts
that is instructive. It derives not from the need to create law or even
defend the system of laws, but from the necessity to maintain minimum
conditions for the creation of legal meaning in autonomous interpretive
communities:
By exercising its superior brute force, however, the
agency of state law shuts down the creative
hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout our
communities. The question, then, is the extent to which
coercion is necessary to the maintenance of minimum
Cover, supra note 1, at 61-62.
Id. at 54 ("In the face of challenge, the judge-armed with no inherently superior
interpretive insight, no necessarily better law-must separate the exercise of violence
from his own person. The only way in which the employment of force is not revealed
as a naked jurispathic act is through the judge's elaboration of the institutional
privilege of force-that is, jurisdiction.").
143

144
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conditions for the creation of legal meaning in
autonomous interpretive communities. 145
Taken together, this multifaceted privatization of the nation
building process, guided by an effort to promote the development of
legal meaning in nomoi, presents a promising approach to dealing with
encroaching populist nationalism. Defining the nation, however, is not
the same as private education, which is part of the paideic process, and
whatever faith Cover has in these limits on the judicial power, he seems
to back away from them in the end. 146
As Nomos and Narrative turns to the Supreme Court decision
under consideration, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,147 Cover's
limits on the judicial power seem to disappear. He argues that the
"redemptive" constitutional ideology should guide resolution of the
dispute:
Precisely because the school is the point of entry to the
paideic and the locus of its creation, the school must be
the target of any redemptive constitutional ideology.
Through education, the social bonds form that give rise
to autonomy, to the jurisgenerative process. In
education are the origins of the processes in which
"law" is given meaning. Were there a single, statist
corpus, a state school, a state understanding-Spartan
eunomia-we might imagine a rather simple
participation-protecting rule to guarantee universal
access to the process. In our own complex nomos,
however, it is the manifold, equally dignified
communal bases of legal meaning that constitute the
array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at
any given time. The judge must resolve the competing
claims of the redemptive constitutionalism of an
excluded race, on one hand, and of insularity, the
protection of association, on the other. 148

145

Id. at 44.

146 Cover wants courts to show "commitment." Id. at 66 ("The grand national travail
against discrimination is given no normative status in the Court's opinion, [no
deference to the paideic process].").
147 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 594 (1983).
148 Cover, supra note 1, at
66.
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Though we might view the foregoing statement as rooted in his
exhortation of judicial coercion as "necessary to the maintenance of
minimum conditions for the creation of legal meaning in autonomous
interpretive communities,"149 Nomos and Narrative does not really
emphasize that role in its treatment of Bob Jones University.
Ultimately, it does not tell us how courts should go about deciding
when it is necessary to apply redemptive constitutional principles for
the purpose of promoting the creation of legal meaning in autonomous
interpretive communities, nor when it is necessary to do so while
rejecting the juridical interpretation of a nomos.
Thus, we could imagine the state granting a larger role for itself
in determining the national identity than it seems to have granted itself
in education. Notwithstanding the threat of this larger role, the theme
of neutrality from Brandeis's concern through Cover's interest in
facilitating jurisgenesis suggest a means of navigating the fight over
the nation. Beyond this, Brandeis's and Cover's neutrality approach
invites a way of thinking about rights in light of the fight over national
identity, which seems most attractive-if individuals are to have
access to the kinds of communities and groups that engage in
jurisgenesis, then those individuals need to be protected from the
excesses of any extant national identity. That is, just as individuals are
guaranteed participation in government through rights that limit the
excesses of the state, individuals ought to be guaranteed participation
in the nation through limits on the excesses of the nation.
IV.

RECOGNIZING NORMATIVE DIFFERENCE IN THE BATTLE
FOR NATION

In Nomos and Narrative, Cover seeks to promote jurisgenesis
by limiting the state's role in education debates.1 50 Despite expressing
doubts about Brandeis's efforts of privatization in Whitney, he expands
on Brandeis's approach, suggesting that the state should largely
privatize the disputes to create greater room for nomoi to develop. 151
He cites approvingly the Court's jurisprudence permitting private
education as an example15 2 but does not apply the constraint of

149
150

Id. at 44.
Id. at 60-61.

151 Id.
152

Id. at 61-62.

NOMOS AND NATION

2022

2079

privatization on the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University.15 3
Instead, he envisions redemptive constitutionalism being invoked as a
justification for the state's jurispathic rejection of Bob Jones
University's racist polices-"there is . . . a powerful response to the
insular claim-the counterclaim of constitutional redemption."1 54 We
are forced to speculate on what limits there might be to this
counterclaim of constitutional redemption, how they derive from the
education cases, and how they might apply to an open-ended debate
that goes to the heart of our shared existence such as the definition of
the nation. The brief discussion below' 5 5 shows that efforts to privatize
the debate might prove ineffective and do not seem to address the
threat of populist nationalist movements. Expanding on Cover's
resolution of Bob Jones University, however, provides another
potential approach to the debate over nation and the threat of populist
nationalist. But that approach proves similarly unsatisfying, appearing
to be indeterminate and circular. Last, I suggest expanding on Nomos
and Narrative's general call to promote jurisgenesis as a basis for
developing a new justification for rights. This last approach provides
a framework for courts to promote nomoi and structure debates over
nation by focusing on an individual's right to express their identity as
well as to form and to live in communities. This structure is, in my
view, a prerequisite to ensuring the kinds of robust communities that
can become nomoi, to permitting those communities to effectively
contribute to a polity's concept of nation, and to recognizing the nation
as a concept formed by members of the communities within the nation
state in an always evolving, fluid, and participatory process.
A.

Problems with Privatizing the Content of the
Nation

Extending Nomos andNarrative'sconception of the nomos to
the battle over what the nation is suggests that one way to contend with
competing nomoi on the question of the nation is to wholly privatize
that question. As the liberal communitarians suggest, national identity
is central, respecting "the importance of our attachments to place and
"I He wants the Court to stand up for its redemptive principles instead of deferring
to public policy without justification; he wants the Court to invoke redemptive
constitutionalism. Id. at 66.
154

1

Id.
Infra Part IV.A.
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the indispensability of possessing a culture we can call our own." 156
The kinds of attachments we possess and the culture we have are
among the kind of identity-forming traits normally guaranteed in rights
systems through the rights of free expression, association, and worship.
As Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney suggests, robust protection of
these values through the First Amendment and parallel rights in other
systems, creates room for individuals and the groups to which they
But such libertarian rights would prove
belong to exist.' 5 7
unsatisfactory to liberal communitarians as it was for Cover. Cover's
approach, however, informed by the belief that the plural state in the
United States lacked the content to support a state nomos, emphasized
a more radical assignment of the role for developing substantive values
to the private sphere, almost certainly more than the liberal
communitarians would.
Extending Cover's observations to debates about nation, the
state should avoid declaring what nation is. This entails not only
relegating debates over what the nation is to the private sphere but
avoiding umpiring between competing conceptions of the nation and
eschewing the state's prerogative to articulate the content of nation.
Cover's argument to privatize debates concerning the nomos is
familiar to us and largely reflected in American constitutional law. It
is also, to a large degree, what International Human Rights calls for.
However, given our divisive political climate and the specific
insistence of some to have government institutions declare the national
identity, a comment seems necessary, especially because government
neutrality on nation seems unusual.
To avoid declaring what nation means, the state should not
prohibit private efforts to comment on and declare the nature of the
national identity and spirt. It would be inappropriate for the state to
prohibit, for example, the New York Times 1619 Project ("1619
Project").1 5 8 The propriety of such projects is for private debate and

156

157
158

Ryan, supra note 84.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The

1619

Project,

N.Y.

TIMEs

(Aug.

18,

2019).

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/i 619-americaslavery.html?.?mc=auddev&ad-keywords=auddevgate&gclid=Cj0KCQjwqpLBhDQARIsAOOa6aKzhYYzsY-

pLTICcO68_MkafWPK2da2SG71E67TuxDq4GHmhB3irIaAo1 VEALw_wcB&g
clsrc=aw.ds.
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the temptation to produce a response1 59 should be resisted. This
example illustrates precisely how conventional this approach is.
Despite the conservative criticism of the 1619 Project and suggestions
that the New York Times should not have undertaken it,1 60 few
suggested that it be banned. 161 Of course, the Trump Administration
did not eschew the opportunity to respond with the 1776 Project, but
nothing in Cover's approach suggests a prohibition on the government
attempting to create a national nomos, even as he expresses concerns
about the state doing so and suggests such efforts would be
unsuccessful.1 62 Likewise, it explains the discomfort many had with
these particular dualling presentations of American history. Also, it
shows the challenge of today: supporters of the 1776 Project see the
project as central to preserving national values they see as being under
attack, 163 and they perceive government involvement as critical to their
national project.1 64 Moreover, they proceed from the view that others
159 E.g., The 1776 Report, PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY 1776 COMMISSION (Jan. 2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-PresidentsAdvisory-1776-Commission-Final-Report.pdf.
160

See generally Adam Serwer, The Fight Over the 1619 Project Is Not About the

Facts,
ATL.
(Dec.
23,
2019,
7:35
PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/historians-clash-1619project/604093 (discussing the dispute between scholars and authors of Project
represents fundamental disagreement over trajectory of American society). That
criticism is specifically about the project's departure from "an interpretation of
American national identity that is cherished by liberals and conservatives alike." Id.
Serwer's review of the debate also shows how criticism by historians was
transformed into political arguments by conservatives to engage a debate about what
the nation is that would eventually lead to the 1776 Project.
161 See generally Adam Serwer, Why Conservatives Want to Cancel the 1619 Project,
ATL. (May 21,2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/whyconservatives-want-cancel-161 9-project/618952.
162 Cover, supra note 1, at 61-62 ("[D]isputes over educational issues raise the
question of the character of the paideia that will constitute the child's world"); id. at
17-18 ("[E]ven if we had a national history declared by law to be authoritative-we
could not share the same account relating each of us as an individual to that history").
163 Marie-Rose Sheinerman, Princeton Historians Condemn Trump Administration's
1776 Commission Report, DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Jan. 24, 2021, 8:58 PM),
https://www.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2021/01/princeton-historians-trumpHistorian David Bell said of the 1776
1776-commission-report-1619-project.
Report, "[m]ost immediately, the motivation was to sort of counteract the 1619
Project . . . particularly since many school districts have decided to use the 1619
Project in their curriculum." Bell is quoted in the article noting that historians who
led the criticism of the 1619 Project also rejected the 1776 Report. Id.
"6 See The 1776 Report, supra note 159.
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are already using the government to promote their view of the nationtheir efforts are conceived as corrective, perhaps even to the neutrality
of liberal pluralism that calls for such neutrality. For them, there is no
neutral position in these debates.
Cover's approach suggests that the state should avoid umpiring
debates over what the nation is. This second step in support of
privatization of the nation debate suggests that judging the propriety of
the content of private debates about the nation is off limits. This is
certainly the extant approach in the United States, but the problem with
this approach is illustrated by the trouble in determining what to do
with hate speech and, harder still, determining the propriety of
regulating speech aimed at recruiting individuals to hate groups.
Most generally, Nomos and Narrative suggests that states
should limit their prerogative to provide interpretive meaning, 165 it
should avoid weighing in on the nation. This suggests that while the
1776 Project is not appropriate from this perspective, it is not
prohibited. The harder question is presented by the French approach
to laicite, 166 illustrating that the state's own definition of its core values
might make withdrawal from discussions of the nation difficult, for
sure in France and likely more generally. At some level, the state
cannot completely withdraw from this sphere in any case as state's
support for public education and regulation of elementary and
secondary education puts it in the position of building curriculum. But
a state might avoid weighing in on nation by ensuring that its school
curriculum should be bland and not transformative, perhaps leaving
room for teachers to interject their views into the curriculum. Almost
certainly such a school curriculum would be unappealing to many in
our divided polity.
An advantage of the foregoing attempts to promote
privatization of nation debates is that they would likely aid in turning
down the heat on the culture wars in the United States today. It is also
apparent that such an approach is unlikely to appeal to the participants

E.g., Cover, supra note 1, at 62 ("There must, in sum, be limits to the state's
prerogative to provide interpretive meaning when it exercises its educative function.
But the exercise is itself troublesome; thus, the private, insular alternative is specially
protected.").
166 See, e.g., Silvio Ferrari, Civil Religions: Models andPerspectives,41 GEo. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 749, 759-61 (2010) for a discussion of laicite in the context of a broader
assessment of "civil religions" in France, Italy, the United States, and the European
Union.
165
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in our culture wars. For them, the privatization of nation avoids critical
issues about who we were, are, or ought to be. The very point of
debates over the nation is to ensure that one's vison of nation,
presumably the true vision, is reflected in the national ethos to the
extent that it does not become the national ethos. The state is supposed
to promote a view of the nation in these accounts and promote the right
one.
More generally, this kind of privatization approach has recently
come under criticism, specifically as it involves human rights and
religion. Madhavi Sundar has complained about how privatization is
unsatisfying.1 67 His complaints about how human rights law treats
religion could be applied with equal force to privatization of debates
about what the nation is.
Premised
on
a
centuries-old,
Enlightenment
compromise thatjustified reason in the public sphere by
allowing deference to religious despotism in the
private, human rights law continues to define religion
in the twenty-first century as a sovereign, extralegal
jurisdiction in which inequality is not only accepted,
but expected. Law views religion as natural, irrational,
incontestable, and imposed-in contrast to the public
sphere, the only viable space for freedom and reason.
Simply put, religion is the "other" of international law.
Today, fundamentalists are taking advantage of this
legal tradition. Yet, contrary to law's centuries-old
conception, religious communities are internally
contested, heterogeneous, and constantly evolving over
time through internal debate and interaction with
outsiders. And this has never been so true as in the
twenty-first century. Individuals in the modern world
increasingly demand change within their religious
communities in order to bring their faith in line with
democratic norms and practices. 168
Sundar's concerns with the privatization of religion seem to
apply equally to the proposed privatization of debates about the nation.
Often assumptions about how the individual was a member of the
nation-defining religious community, where reason retreated to
167 Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
168 Id. at 1402-03.
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passion and irrationality, are justifications for leaving questions about
the nature of nation to private debate. Few still think of the nation as
a static concept since the serious study of nation emerged in the 1980s.
The nation, like religious communities, "are internally contested,
heterogenous, and constantly evolving over time through internal
debate and interaction with outsiders."1 69 And the illiberalism of
populist nationalism mirrors the internal religious intolerance that
Sundar seems concerned with. However, we have generally relegated
debates about nation to the private sphere, creating the dilemma the
liberal communitarians face, generating the crisis liberal societies have
in dealing with populist nationalist, and roughly duplicating the
problem Sundar identifies with respect to religion.
But Sundar's analysis appears to labor under the extant frame
of thinking about rights as specifically aimed at government action: the
public/private distinction is assumed and critical here. At the same
time, abandoning the distinction would seem to grant the state
sovereignty over our individual minds, to introduce a kind of
intolerable intrusion in individual freedom that makes the benefits of
doing so seem so small in comparison. Sundar has, I think, highlighted
the limits of our existing approach to rights in a way that is parallel to
how communitarians have cast a spotlight on the individualistic
excesses of some approaches to rights. This is all to say that
privatization of the nation question seems unsatisfying and, if Sundar
is to be believed, might make worse the battle between nomoi on the
nature of nation, especially considering populist nationalists.
B.

An Interstitial Resolution: Ensuring Peace as a
Redemptive Value

Another aspect of Cover's "sympathy" for Bob Jones
University is that it emphasizes that the litigation involved was not so
much about Brown or desegregation, as it was about how to deal with
nomoi that are at odds with the prevailing national ethos. Though the
Supreme Court was beginning its retrenchment on civil rights and had
arguably already transformed Brown from an anti-segregation decision
to an anti-discrimination one, Brown was the prevailing national and
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juridical ethic of the country. 17 0 Nomos and Narrativetells us how we
should deal with outliers from that definitional vision of the country.
One answer-the one Cover offers in Nomos and Narrativeis that the state rightly subordinates divergent nomoi to "redemptive
constitutionalism." 1 7 ' In doing so, the Court should be respectful of
nomoi in the way that Cover models with his "sympathy." The article
devotes most of its pages to discussing the challenge presented by
nomoi and insisting how the judicial process is jurispathic, however
necessary the imperial function might make it. He devotes very few
pages to saying what the Court should have done in Bob Jones
University because it should be apparent to the reader by then: utilize
its imperial function resolutely in service of redemptive values it can
and should defend.1 72 This is a violent function, but it is a necessary
one, and the Court should not pretend it is anything otherwise-nor
should it shy away from what needs to be done.
This is what the Court had already been doing albeit at the
expense of Brown's desegregation goals by announcing "Our
Federalism" as a judicial principle in Younger v. Harris,173 then
extending that redemptive value in O'Shea v. Littleton17 4 and Los
Angeles v. Lyons. 175 These decisions nominally present different
constitutional and procedural questions but are united in preserving
Our Federalism. That police abuse and discrimination in the operation
of the criminal justice system were critical issues during the civil rights
movement and remain so today is part of the price we have paid in
service of Our Federalism. But this kind of constitutionalism reflects,
it seems, what Cover had in mind, albeit with extension of Brown as
his goal.
The "redemptive constitutionalism" approach suggests that
courts dealing with disputes involving the definition of the nation or a
national ideal might identify in our Constitution critical, nationdefining values and enforce them in appropriate cases. The battle
170

See, e.g., OwEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 86-89 (1978) (describing
how Brown changed courts' approach to equitable remedies).
171 See Cover, supra note 1, at 60 ("The courts may well rely upon the jurisdictional

screen and rules of toleration to avoid killing the law of the insular communities that
dot our normative landscape. But they cannot avoid responsibility for applying or
refusing to apply power to fulfill a redemptionist vision.").
172 Id. at 66.

173 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
174 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).
175 461 U.S. 95, 135 (1983).
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between groups might contest different aspects of our nation, but the
Court is equipped, and perhaps expected by Cover, to intervene and
take a side, insomuch as these disputes involve foundational
constitutional values. It is not possible to say, at least ahead of time,
what those values are; however, the Constitution, documents like the
Federalist Papers, and certain historical understandings of the
country's history provide sources for identifying foundational
constitutional values. "Nationalist intellectuals may well invent a
tradition, but they cannot invent just any tradition-it must fit within
some recognizable continuum of distinctive local features."' 76 Those
features are part of our constitutional tradition, however much that
tradition might be contested. To the extent that nomoi threaten to
destroy the order, the imperial character of courts is justified in
suppressing them to avoid the Constitution becoming a suicide pact.1 7 7
The difficulty that should be apparent with a redemptive
constitutionalism approach is that populist nationalists are asserting
broad claims about what the nation is that converts this solution into a
circular one. If populist nationalists' illiberal position says, for
example, that only white men can be citizens, one cannot answer that
question "outside" of their reading of the Constitution and its history.
Moreover, we have recently come to recognize that our political order
is much less instantiated in binding documents, as opposed to informal
tradition, than we thought. 7 8 So, as Cover noted, even agreement
about foundational texts do not produce accord on the meaning of those
texts. And it should also be evident that the current textualism
dominating constitutional interpretation proves less than helpful in
Populist
addressing questions put at this level of abstraction.
nationalists are insisting that the texts and history of the country should
be read as designed by people like them, for them, and in their
interest.1 7 9
176

Judt, supra note 75, at 8.

177 See Cover, supra note 1, at 16.
178 See, e.g., David Frum, The Seven Broken Guardrailsof Democracy, ATL. (May
31, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/the-seven-brokenguardrails-of-democracy/484829; but see Elaine Kamarck, Did Trump Damage
American
Democracy?,
BROOKNGS
(July
9,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/07/09/did-trump-damage-americandemocracy.
179 Linda Greenhouse notes that Katherine Stewart, in her book The Power
Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism, argues that the
goal of "religious nationalist" is dismantling the

2022

NOMOS AND NATION

2087

Cover is useful here is one important aspect. His call for
"commitment" means that he would likely have not worried about
rejecting the illiberal populist nationalist views. Nomos and Narrative
does tell us that
[m]aintaining the world is no small matter and requires
no less energy than creating it. Let loose, unfettered, the
worlds created would be unstable and sectarian in their
social organization, dissociative and incoherent in their
discourse, wary and violent in their interactions. The
sober imperial mode of world maintenance holds the
mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the
discipline of institutional justice upon norms, and
places the constraint of peace on the void at which
strong bonds cease. 180
From this we can infer an overarching imperial value of tolerance and
peace that would inform rejection of illiberal nomoi like populist
nationalist communities. Indeed, we can read this back into Cover's
criticism of the Court's lack of commitment. The sense that its
abandonment of Brown's redemptive values in favor of bureaucratic
values, reflected an abandonment of the key imperial value of world
maintenance when it was needed. Segregation needed to be put to bed
in Bob Jones University, but the court had only decided that the I.R.S.
had been given power by Congress.1 8 1
My speculation about Cover's position reveals that Nomos and
Narrative ultimately only suggests as much as the liberal
communitarians do: liberal nationalism requires an approach for
deciding how to deal with competing visions of nation (different
nomoi) that neither capitulates to illiberal groups nor disparages the
centrality of the nomos to individuals. Cover's tacit argument that
secular state itself, the obstacle to establishing God's kingdom on earth.
According to Stewart . . . the goal is "dominionism," a word all but
unknown in secular society but very familiar on the religious right, which
she defines as "the fundamental idea that right-thinking Christians should
assume power in all spheres of life."

Linda Greenhouse, Grievance ConservativesAre Here to Stay, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/07/01/grievance(July
1,
2021),
conservatives-are-here-to-stay (book review).
180 Cover, supra note 1, at 16.
181 Id. at 66. See id. at 64 n.188 ("The only support in legislative history for the Bob
Jones University result was Congress' behavior after the IRS' 1970 ruling."). See
also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598-602 (1983).
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courts should act to promote jurisgenesis arguably provides that
approach.
C.

Promoting Jurisgenesis Through a New
Justification for (Some) Rights

The final suggestion Cover implies for states dealing with
nomoi emphasizes courts facilitating the jurisgenerative capacity of
nomoi by avoiding "a total crushing of the jurisgenerative
character." 18 2 Because this component is not an express tactic for
dealing with conflicting nomoi in Nomos and Narrative and because
Cover never says what it means to avoid crushing the jurisgenerative
character of nomoi outside of the privatization he observes in the
education cases, this approach is both an enticing and vague response
to nomoi, and to nation. Perhaps it is not really an independent
response to competing nomoi. It seems subsumed in the approaches
Cover enumerates for privatizing questions of content in education
disputes, providing only an explanation of the goal of such
privatization. In this case it would offer little guidance on how we
might deal with competing visions of the nation but we can imagine
what I will call "promoting jurisgenesis" as an independent approach
to dealing with dueling nomoi in ways that could help us think about
competing visions of nation.
i.

Some Ways of PromotingJurisgenesis

Promoting jurisgenesis is no less vague for separating it from
the privatization of education approach that Cover highlighted.
Promoting jurisgenesis might be understood to be as narrow as a
judicial attitude, suggesting a demeanor for courts contending with
disputes involving competing nomoi to bring to such disputes. In
difficult cases of competing nomoi, courts would use the goal of
promoting jurisgenesis to tip the outcome in one direction or another.
This approach seems at odds with the way Cover reviewed the cases
of states seeking to set public education curricula and with his
resolution of the Bob Jones University dispute. In the first instance he
sees courts responding to conflicts between the public curriculum and
nomoi leading to "a breathtaking acknowledgment of the privilege of

182 Cover, supra note 1, at 62.
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insular autonomy for all sorts of groups and associations." 183 In the
latter case, he calls for the Court to "resolve the competing claims of
the redemptive constitutionalism of an excluded race, on one hand, and
of insularity, the protection of association, on the other" 184 by
embracing the redemptive constitutionalism at the expense of the
protection of association. Nomos and Narrativeitself seems to suggest
that promoting jurisgenesis requires more than just a judicial attitude.
"Promoting jurisgenesis" might suggest direct government
support for nomoi but this reading also runs afoul of how Cover read
the education cases in the very passage from which I have derived
promoting jurisgenesis. In Nomos and Narrative Cover is concerned
that such a centralized approach is not possible.
The state's extended recognition of associational
autonomy in education is the natural result of the
understanding of the problematic character of the state's
paideic role. There must, in sum, be limits to the state's
prerogative to provide interpretive meaning when it
exercises its educative function. But the exercise is
itself troublesome; thus, the private, insular alternative
is specially protected. Any alternative to these limits
would invite a total crushing of the jurisgenerative
character. The state might become committed to its own
meaning and destroy the personal and educative bond
that is the germ of meanings alternative to those of the
power wielders. 185
Promoting jurisgenesis is thus unlikely to mean government
articulation of a nomoi, even (or particularly) around what is the
nation.1 86
"8 Id. at 61.
184 Id. at 66.
185 Id. at 61-62. And earlier Cover notes that: "[E]ven were we to share some single
authoritative account of the framing of the text - even if we had a national history
declared by law to be authoritative-we could not share the same account relating
each of us as an individual to that history." Id. at 17-18.
Of course, states have molded nation, as William
186 Eskridge, supra note 41.
Eskridge notes in critique of Scalia's use of Kulturkampf, to describe efforts to
recognize L.G.B.T.Q. rights:
The first Kulturkampf, the campaign that gave rise to the term, was
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's program between 1871 and 1887
to yoke the Roman Catholic Church to ideological state control. Roman
Catholic practices were demonized as fit only for "womanly peoples" and
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One might read promoting jurisgenesis in line with the current
argument of some religious rights advocates to suggest that courts
should prioritize religious belief and practice over the rights of
individuals when they conflict. 18 7 So groups in general might have
primacy over individuals to emphasize their jurisgenerative potential.
Apart from whether such an approach is feasible, there is nothing in
Nomos and Narrative to support it. Indeed, part of what is bracing
about the article is its clear-eyed understanding that nomoi do not just
attend to internal concerns. Some seek to transform the world in their
own image. "People associate not only to transform themselves, but
also to change the social world in which they live. Associations, then,
are a sword as well as a shield. They include collective attempts .. . to
change the law or the understanding of the law."' 88 And the world they
would create would not likely be tolerant one.
Although all of these groups had a place in their
normative worlds for civil authority, and although some
would transform civil authority into an intolerant arm
of their own substantive vision when the chance arose,
all, finding themselves within a state not under their
control, sought a refuge not simply from persecution,
but for associational self-realization in nomian terms. 189
Nomos and Narrative seems particularly opposed to any one nomos
automatically winning disputes and seems at odds with nomoi
exceptionalism: though nomoi create meaning they remain throughout
subject to the state's jurispathic tendencies.
Cover's early discussion of freedom of association suggests
that it facilitates nomoi in a way that could stand in for "promoting
jurisgenesis."
inconsistent with the centralized, homogenous, nation-state that Bismarck
was building. To reconcile the goals of state centralization and cultural

homogeneity with the deviant Catholic nomos, Bismarck asserted state
control over the education, appointment, and speech of parish priests;
dismantled church institutions; and expelled religious resisters. Unlike

later Nazi policies, Kulturkampf was (is) a campaign of domestication and
conformity, not genocide and annihilation. Nonetheless, when the state

acts as aggressively as it does in a Kulturkampf, judicial acquiescence is
jurispathic and scarcely neutral, contrary to Scalia.

Id. at 2414.
187 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
188 Cover, supra note 1, at 33-34.
189
Id. at 31.
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Freedom of association is the most general of the
Constitution's doctrinal categories that speak to the
creation and maintenance of a common life, the social
precondition for a nomos. From the point of view of
state doctrine, the simplest way to generalize the points
that I have made concerning the ways in which various
groups have built their own normative worlds is to
recognize that the norm-generating aspects of
corporation law, contract, and free exercise of religion
are all instances of associational liberty protected by the
Constitution. Freedom of association implies a degree
of norm-generating autonomy on the part of the
association. It is not a liberty to be but a liberty and
capacity to create and interpret law-minimally, to
interpret the terms of the association's own being. 190
But Cover introduces this language in the process of
juxtaposing "insular" and "redemptive" nomoi. For the insular nomoi
rights protections like the associational rights above seem adequate.1 9 1
"When groups generate their own articulate normative orders
concerning the world as they would transform it, as well as the mode
of transformation and their own place within the world, the situation is
different-a new nomos, with its attendant claims to autonomy and
respect, is created." 192 The existence of such "redemptive" nomoi and
their potential to conflict with other nomoi and with the state presents
an issue not adequately addressed by association rights as we
understand them. This is the problem Nomos and Narrative is built
Consequently, "promoting jurisgenesis," if
around addressing.
anything, must mean something different from just promoting
association rights that protect individuals and indirectly the groups to
which they belong from the state's jurispathic tendencies. It implies
something more than the kind of individual rights we have come to
associate with the Constitution and human rights regimes. It suggests
a different perspective on rights aimed specifically at promoting
jurisgenesis.
190

Id. at 32.
Id. at 34 ("Commonality of interests and objectives may lead to regularities in
social, political, or economic behavior among numbers of individuals. Such
regularities, however, can be accommodated within a framework of individual
191

rights.").

192 Id.
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PromotingJurisgenesiswith a New
Perspectiveon Rights

Promoting jurisgenesis is not explored in Nomos and
Narrative, yet it perhaps supplies a most attractive means of dealing
with illiberal nomoi like a populist nationalist. How this might be
requires recognizing the revolutionary contribution of the nomos to our
thinking about law and focusing on how that contribution might
change how we think about rights. That is, taking nomoi seriously
demands that we reconstruct how we think about the role of rights.
Specifically, I wish to introduce a second dimension for thinking about
how rights protect individuals from the potential excesses of the nation
state. That dimension focuses on individual's interaction with the
nation and supplements the traditional focus on rights as a means of
protecting individuals from the excesses of the state. While this article
is not the place for a full exposition of this new way of thinking about
rights, a brief summary of it demonstrates how taking nomoi seriously
and focusing on facilitating the jurisgenerative capacity of nomoi can
enrich our understanding of and justification for rights and protections.
The impetus for reconsidering how we think about rights has
to do with the inadequacy of the associational rights for addressing
conflict between nomoi that is suggested in Nomos and Narrative. It
also derives from the need for a framework for structuring arguments
among nomoi. Silvio Ferarri makes a similar suggestion, arguing that
the Westphalian nation state is in crisis, particularly because the
national element of states has frayed, undermining for him, the critical
role of civil religion in binding a national community together:
[W]e should be aware that the Westphalian state is no
longer a viable model even in its birthplace, Europe.
National states are no longer the same. Moreover, the
world seems to be experiencing dissociation between
law and love. While the state still provides an
unsurpassed legal framework for its citizens' lives,
much stronger than that provided by transnational and
international organizations, many states are no longer
nations in the sense that they have lost the ability to
create the emotional commitment that once
characterized the national state. Immigration and
globalization have put an end to the identification of
state and nation described by Hanna Arendt at the
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beginning of the 1950s. Today, states host within their
borders many nations, constituted by different cultural,
ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial communities that
are taking the place of the nation as the locus of
belonging, commitment, and solidarity. This explains
why civil religion cannot work anymore as a factor of
social cohesion as long as we have the pretension of
creating it at the national level. 193
From this observation, Ferrari sees Cover's Nomos andNarrative as a
beacon shining the way:
According to Robert Cover . . . everyone lives in a
normative universe, which Cover defines as "a world of
right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and
void." Religious communities are a good example of
these normative worlds; they are the places where new
legal meanings are created through the personal
commitment of the community members who apply
their will to transform the "extant state of affairs"
according to their "visions of alternative futures." But,
the coexistence of different legal worlds requires a
system-maintaining force, which Cover identifies in the
"universalist virtues" of liberalism, embodied in the
modern state. Without them, these legal worlds "would
be unstable and sectarian in their social organization,
dissociative and incoherent in their discourse, wary and
violent in their interactions." In other words, normative
communities cannot flourish without the state legal
framework.
Although it is difficult to fall in love with a legal
framework, it is possible to recognize that its existence
is a matter of common interest, as normative
communities cannot flourish without it. Therefore,
while states should make room within their legal
systems for the communities where belonging and
commitment can be found, states should also recognize
that they need the legal framework because it provides
193 Ferrari, supra note 166, at 759-60.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

2094

Vol. 37

the rules governing the playing field where they live
and compete. This issue of rules is controversial. On the
one hand, rules cannot be directly derived from the
normative communities (as defined by Cover) because
they would not be sufficiently inclusive. On the other
hand, the rules cannot be completely detached from the
normative communities, as only the normative
communities are able to provide the values on which
rules are based. It is important to understand that no
playing field is absolutely neutral and, for this reason,
the best way to deal with this dilemma is to reduce the
playing field's rules to the minimum required for a fair
game.194
For Ferrari, civic religions, having lost the ability to automatically bind
communities together as the nation has frayed, still provide a basis for
building a needed connection.
The notion of civil religion had something to do with
the search for a nucleus of values able to create a
cohesive group of individuals. When a particular
religion or culture cannot perform this unifying role,
civil religion takes its place by providing a set of values,
symbols, and rituals upon which the spiritual unity and
social cohesion of a nation can be rebuilt. 19 5
This process is distinctly tied to the nation and national identity
formation as civil religion provides a "cluster of historically rooted
values and principles [and] constitutes the framework within which
national identity is redefined, thus allowing changes to take place
without breaking too sharply from the past."1 96 From this, a citizen
can be a "full" citizen by "sharing a common narrative, partaking in
some foundational myths, and developing a sense of belonging,
solidarity, and commitment." 197 That is, neutral rules for how civil
religions (and other value forming communities and groups) come to
the debate about nation can invigorate the contemporary nation state
with the content that Cover believed necessary to a fulfilling life and
which he believed states could not deliver through a state nomos. This
194
Id
195

at 760-61.

Id. at 749.

196 Id.

197 Id.

at 750.
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is what liberal communitarians seek as well. Nomos and Narrative
seems to point the way to a structure that ensures nation. But what
does that look like?
Our understanding of rights, constitutional and human, focuses
on the relationship between individual and state. This is the extant
"dimension" for thinking about and justifying rights. Rights are limits
on the state's exercise of power, whether that power is exercised on
behalf of "the people," the greater good, tradition, or the interest of a
despot. Under this dimension, individuals are predominant and their
membership in communities, nomoi, religions are secondary, leading
to various communitarian critiques of rights, 198 among others. I am
suggesting that recognition of a second dimension for thinking about
and justifying rights would focus on the relationship between
individual and nation. Rights would also be conceived as a limit on
the nation's exercise of power-that is, the government acting to
impose a national view but also the interaction between groups that,
through that interaction forms the extant nation. This dimension still
centers on the individual, but in juxtaposing the individual to the
nation, it recognizes that individuals exist in groups and communities.
As members of often overlapping groups, individuals contest the
meaning of their world (the nation) every bit as much as citizens - as
members of political clubs and parties - contest the constitution of the
government. As citizens might participate in the democratic process
individually or collectively, individuals might participate in the nationforming process individually or in groups. The richness of social
existence and group membership is thus not at odds with this
justification of rights so much as it is assumed and, by necessity,
facilitated by this justification for rights-"[p]eople associate not only
to transform themselves, but also to change the social world in which
they live."1 99 Given the state's near monopoly on justified use of force,
this dimension mostly operates as a justification of rights, changing
our understanding of rights enforcement only on the margin. But it
imagines an open competition over the content of nation according to
rules that guarantee an open society. As opposed to an illiberal
populist nationalist, there are no privileged views of nation.
a.)

The Extant Dimension of Rights:

198 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1st ed.

199 Cover, supra note 1, at 33.

1982).
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Individual versus Government
The systems of human and civil rights that gained force and
significance in the twentieth century were devised to limit the
incredible power of the nation state. When first envisioned in the
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man, these rights were aimed at the state as such, given
the limited conceptualization of the nation.
The primary meaning of "nation", and the one most
frequently ventilated in the literature, was political. It
equated "the people" and the state in a manner of the
American and French Revolutions, an equation which
is familiar in such phrases as "the nation-state", the
"United Nations", or the rhetoric of late-twentiethcentury presidents.2 0 0
Thus, the rights articulated during the revolutionary period were the
natural rights of man against the state. Though nation was also used
in ways similar to our current conceptions, the nation was equated with
state often enough that it is not surprising that human and civil rights
emerged as focused on the state component of the nation-state. Rights,
in any case, are naturally directed at the government which exercises a
practical monopoly on justified use of force.
Through its creation, the United Nations Human Rights system
evaded theoretical questions about the source of rights through a
complex network of treaties and a limited number of customary
international law norms that make such rights largely positivist rights.
This
Constitutional rights have a similar positivist provenance.
positivism makes the state the specific respondent to rights (rights are
against the state) and therefore, the focus of thinking about the
justification of rights. The combination of a focus on the government
apparatus of the state and a positivist construction of rights leads one
understandably to conceive of rights as justified by the need to protect
individuals from the state and treats other disputes as private (outside
rights of these kinds).
Exercise of the sovereign power of the state is thus limited.
States ought not summarily execute persons in their jurisdiction,
disappear them, or torture them. Violations of these principles
notwithstanding, there exists in rights systems an understanding that
200 HOBSBAWM, supra note 5, at 18.
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the state should not abuse its citizens. However, rights are not
unlimited and the state acting on behalf of its citizens has a tremendous
range of action. Between these sharp limitations on treatment of
people subject to its powers and the recognition of the state's range of
rightful action lie several more difficult rights questions that, for our
purposes here, I will suggest are "due process" questions. In those
questions, substantive and procedural rights merge sometimes limiting
government action but not always; these are rights defined by degree.
Disputes between individuals, in all cases, are private and generally
beyond rights protection.
b.)

Ignoring the Nation

Even as the idea of a nation state emerged as the primary way
of thinking about international political organization, the national
component of that entity has not been the subject of rights. In part, this
is because the national character of the state was under theorized.
Little attention was paid to the national component of nation states
aside from utilizing the existence of a "nation" as a justification for the
state's legitimacy with jurisdiction over particular peoples. Nation was
mostly assumed and, in any case, not seen as the proper subject of
rights-based protections of citizens.2 0 1
Moreover, any concerns about individuals' interaction with the
nation in the nation state seems easily enough addressed through
regulation of the government institutions since the nation does not
ordinarily act except perhaps through government institutions claiming
to act in its name. Moreover, government institutions have generally
exercised a key role in defining and implementing the national identity
of a nation state. As nation states emerged, the states created
centralized educational systems that bound nations together though
literacy in a national language. States oversaw, or themselves built the
transportation and communications infrastructure that made a cohesive
And the administrative apparatus of the state
nation possible.
standardized and brought together common policies that, in working
in service of the nation, advantaged some communities over others,
notably in its regulation of the borders and design of immigration
policies that sought in the Americas to preserve or transform the
character of the national population. States also negotiated the
201 Id. at 24 ("[M]uch of the liberal theory of nations emerges only, as it were, on the

margins of the discourse of liberal writers."). See also id. at 14-45.
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relationship between religions, establishing national religions and
often determining a role for other religious communities in their
jurisdiction.
But several problems emerge if rights, naturally applicable
against the state, are conceived only in reference to the individual
versus the state. For our purposes, these problems coalesce around the
problem of "minorities" as understood in the early twentieth-century
international order. 2 02 This is the issue of equal treatment versus
special treatment in the law that dates to Plessy's contemptuous
suggestion that black litigants sought special favor in the law, 203 which
202 See, e.g., The League and the Minorities Treaties, 5 BULL. INT'L NEWS 3, 3-10
(1929).
Under the terms of the Treaties, the signatory States undertook to ensure
to all the inhabitants within their frontiers protection of life and liberty and

free exercise of their religion, without distinction of birth, nationality,
language, race, or religion. All nationals of the country were declared
equal before the law, and enjoy the same civil and political rights.

Id. at 4. The treaties limited the authority of Poland (Minorities Treat, 28th June,
1919, which were used as a model for the other treaties), Czechoslovakia, Greece,
and Yugoslavia (Minorities Treaties, 10th September 1919), Austria (Articles 64-69
of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 20th September, 1919), Bulgaria (Treaty of
Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27 November, 1919), Rumania (Minorities Treaty, 9th December
1919, extended to Bessarabia, 28th October, 1920), Hungary (Articles 54-60 Treaty
of Trianon, 4th June, 1920), and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne, 24th July 1923,
replacing the earlier but unratified Treaty of Sbvres). Id. at 10.
203 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the

colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it. . . The argument . . . assumes that social
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot
be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two
races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual

appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals.
.. "When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens
equal rights before the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and

progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was organized, and
performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with which it
is endowed." Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to

abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do
so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be
inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the

same plane.
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relegated to the private sphere questions of social equality, even as it
sanctioned erection of a system of enforced subordination. And in
modern constitutional law, this is the problem of protecting "discrete
and insular minorities" from the tyranny of the majority. 204 Stated
broadly, if the state is to treat all citizens equally, how can it account
for differences among its citizens? And, to the extent that difference
takes the form of the kind of cohesive communities Cover called nomoi
the problem of dealing with such difference amounts to dealing with
nascent nationalism. In Nomos and Narrative,Cover saw this problem
as a choice between competing nomoi: "The judge must resolve the
competing claims of the redemptive constitutionalism of an excluded
race, on one hand, and of insularity, the protection of association, on
the other." 205 But for both, recognition by the law stands at odds with
equality before the law.
Many communities resemble the minority populations
consigned to newly created nation states after World War I and
provided protection in the Minorities Treaties. Though popular
sovereignty and self-determination are central ideas associated with
the nation state and protected by international law since the formation
of the United Nations, 2 06 the idea that all "nations" should have their
own states has been more theoretical than real, 207 leaving many
ostensible national groups stuck under the authority of nation states
dominated by other communities. These nascent nations share with
other kinds of minority populations a potentially problematic
existence. Minorities are conceived as permanently outside the
national polity. Rights provide protection but do not guarantee
vibrancy of the community, particularly over the long run. More
broadly, rights that are conceived as checks on the state's treatment of
its citizens must either ignore the community membership of the
individual citizen or assume that the individual needs protection as a
member of a particular community. The former minimizes the
significance of the community; the latter risks essentializing the
Id. at 551-52. See also Justice Bradley's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.

3, 25 (1883).

204 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980), which builds on the famous footnote four of United
States v. Carolene ProductsCo., 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938).
201 Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
206 See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL

REAPPRAISAL 19 (1st ed. 1995).
207
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (6th ed. 2003).
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community's characteristics while also undermining the possibility of
multiple group memberships (intersectional identity) among
individuals, including individuals of minority groups sharing or
participating in the extant national identity.
This stilted choice has structured our approach to civil rights
and confrontation with Jim Crow segregation and its legacy. Rights
require the government to manage its treatment of minorities. A just
nation state must guarantee equal citizenship as equality before the
law. It must ensure the complexity of associational rights Cover
emphasized in Nomos and Narrative:freedom of religion; freedom of
speech and association; and freedom of association. 208 These rights
belong to individuals and protect them against abuse by the state,
permitting them to be the individual they are. For a member of a
minority community, however, these rights do not necessarily permit
their community to thrive. Individuals can find relief in a kind of
assimilation. Perhaps they can integrate into a civic community that
has, theoretically, no communities or groups but which might
realistically be seen as dominated by one (plural republic). 2 09 Or they
might fold into a more candidly dominant group identity in a state with
a purportedly homogeneous nationalism.
Throughout the 20th Century, this kind of assimilation was
what the American pluralist nationalism offered. 2 10 However, this
assimilationist vision functioned in tandem with the formal and
informal segregation of Jim Crow that, in any case, permitted
systematic and severe private discrimination to further confine black
Americans to second class citizenship and generally create a racial and
ethnic hierarchy. 21 1 Rights were an awkward and imperfect solution
to Jim Crow segregation and inequality. The whole period of Jim
Crow segregation existed under the rights regime of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however much Plessey and related cases might have
limited its scope. 2 12 And as Brown sought to deploy post-World War
II rights enthusiasm to reverse Plessy, it was initially viewed as
208 Cover, supra note 1, at 32-33.
20 See the example of Jews in France as described by Smith. SMITH, supra
note 80,
at 44-45.
210

See

RICHARD

D. ALBA

AND

VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN

MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (2009).
211 See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC
STORY OF AMERICA'S GREAT MIGRATION 9-11 (2010).

212 See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
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morally correct but legally questionable with efforts to envisage
"neutral principles" for ending segregation proving difficult to
conceive. 213 Needling the rights regime was the worry about special
rights for minorities. 214
The Permanent Court of International Justice's efforts to
protect minority groups in newly formed states after World War I had
already revealed in 1935 this problem that, in any case, was central to
the reasoning of the Court in Plessy.21 5 In its advisory opinion in
Minority Schools in Albania, the Permanent Court's efforts to extend
to the Albanian complainants recognition as a distinct entity, seemed
to give them special favor in the law, running up against the injunction
to ensure all citizens are equal before the law.2 16 Like other groups in
the system of minority protections, the Albanian complainants
struggled to preserve their language, religious beliefs, and educational
institutions in face of government efforts to impose standardized
programs on all citizens. The Permanent Court described the problem:
The idea underlying the treaties for protection of
minorities is to secure for certain elements incorporated
in a State, the population of which differs from them in
race, language or religion, the possibly of living
peaceably alongside that population and co-operating
amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the
characteristics which distinguish them from the
majority, and satisfying the ensuring special needs.
In order to attain this object, two things were regarded
as particularly necessary, and have formed the subject
of provisions in these treaties.
The first is the ensure that nationals belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in

213 Naturally, this is the problem defined in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral

Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1959).
214 John Valery White, The Turner Thesis, Black Migration, and the (Misapplied)
Immigrant Explanation of Black Poverty, 5 NEv. L.J. 6, 41-53 (2004) (discussing

Hughes v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 339 U.S. 470 (1950)).

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 64, at art. 48-51 (Apr. 6).
215
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every respect on perfect equality with the other
nationals of the State.
The second is to ensure for the minority elements
suitable means for their racial peculiarities, their
traditions and their national characteristics. 2 17
The Permanent Court conceived these necessities of the treaties as
closely interlocked but the respondent Greek government saw its
statutes, which applied equally to all, as satisfying the first requirement
and regarded the second requirement as undermining equal treatment.
The majority disagreed, seeing the second requirement as necessary to
equality "in law but also in fact." 2 18
The state defendant in Minority Schools in Albania saw
individual equal treatment as what the treaty required. The individual
versus government framework for thinking about rights suggested that
recognition of distinct groups was at odds with rights as protection of
individuals from government abuse.
It is surprising that these issues were already being aired some
twenty years before Brown, and more than forty years before Regents
of Univ. of California v. Bakke. 219 A similar emphasis on individual
rights undermined efforts to dismantle Jim Crow and address its related
inequalities through policies like affirmative action or broad remedies
such as those addressed in Martin v. Wilkes. 220 The emphasis on
individual rights itself had the effect of minimizing, or even erasing
the history and present effects of segregation. That emphasis also
tended to transfer blame onto those effected through a victim blaming,
personal responsibility framework, especially when invoked as part of
arguments saying that present economic and social conditions
explained inequality better than the legacy of segregation.221
Indeed, we might see the frustration and impatience of the
Summer 2020 Black Lives Matter protests 222 and their leaders'
2 17

Id. See also PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

105-111 (2013) (showing a reconstruction of the Albanian Advisory Opinion).
218 ALSTON & GOODMAN,

supra note

217, at 109.

219 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978).
220

490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989).

221 See generally WILLIAM

(1st ed. 1978).

JULIUS WILSON,

THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

222 Larry Buchanan et. al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S.
History,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
3,
2020),
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associated rejection of civil rights litigation and constitutionalism as a
response to this emphasis on the individual rights model and narrowing
of the response to the condition of black Americans through an
individual rights framework. 2 2 3 The movements associated with the
Summer 2020 protests are characterized by loudly proclaiming that
racism (institutional or otherwise) still exists, against the arguments
that inequality is the result of present social conditions, like a culture
of poverty or single parent homes, as was emphasized in the 1980s and
1990s. 224 The movements are insistent that change happen now,
without regard to legal restrictions that have developed over the years
(like the sharp limits on affirmative action-like programs). The
movements have been characterized by their focus on results without
any deference to limits on the ability of institutions to achieve those
results.
A robust rights regime aimed at protecting citizens from the
abuse of the state seems inadequate to addressing legacy inequality for
groups like black Americans whose identity is tied up with the history
of slavery, segregation, oppression, and inequality. The rights regime
further seems to lack the capacity to respond to present inequalities
created by disdain for sub-communities without such long histories of
systematic isolation and discrimination, much less individuals who
have only recently come to be able to express their identity in public
like L.G.B.T.Q. individuals. The difficulty is that the rights regime's
focus on individual versus state ignores what communitarians and
advocates of recognition see as critical aspects of a person's being:
who they see themselves to be and how that identity is situated in
communities. 22 5 These critiques of individual rights differ but come
together in worries about the limits of individual rights. These kinds
of rights fail to offer adequate protection from populist nationalists
who, in seeking to take over the state apparatus, view rights as part of
the problem.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowdsize.html?searchResultPosition= 1.
223 See White, supra note 37, at 1004.
224 This is apparent in the policy platform of the Movement for Black Lives. See
Vision for Black Lives 2020 Policy Platform, M4BL, https://m4bl.org/policyplatforms/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
225 See also MAKAu MUTUA, Human Rights and the African Fingerprint,in HUMAN
RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 76, 82 (2002) (asserting that the

"African conception of man is not that of an isolated and abstract individual, but an
integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity").
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Liberal communitarians extend worries about the narrow scope
of rights to the question of the place of nation in our thinking about
nation states. Nomos and Narrative focuses us on how nomoi may be
insular or redemptive, and how those nomoi might accommodate
themselves to life in the larger community or contend to influence it
and impose a vision of community and law on the polity. Associational
rights of individual versus the state are inadequate to structure how
nomoi vie to influence the nation as those rights only create room for
insular nomoi to emerge. Part of Cover's insight seems to be that those
redemptive nomoi seeking to transform the world in their image go
beyond the inward-looking commitments of insular nomoi. 226 They
force the question of the conflict with the state over the meaning of
law. Similarly, even liberal redemptive nomoi would push against
state meaning (we want them to, don't we), forcing a choice between
state and nomos. Associational rights create room for the nomos but
say little about how to balance the nomos and the state. How ought
the contest over nation be structured in a way that does not lead to a
war of nomoi? How might we mitigate the way that criticism of rights
especially as related to nation has devolved in some quarters into a
These questions require
justification for authoritarianism? 227
acknowledgement of the national component of the nation state.
c.)

An Individual versus Nation Dimension
of Rights

Focusing on the nation and individuals' interaction with the
nation structures how we might promote jurisgenesis. Nation is a
contested idea, disputed every bit as much as contests over control of
the state apparatus for which democracy is seen as a critical
requirement. If political control of the state is contested through
democratic processes, control of the national identity is contested in
civil society. Cover's nomoi, existing under the authority of the state,
226 Cover, supra note 1, at 33 ("People associate not only to transform
themselves,
but also to change the social world in which they live.").
227 Criticism of rights has become a central part of populist nationalist complaint.
See EATWELL & GOODWIN, supra note 68. More broadly, rights have been criticized
for failing to recognize or honor the cultural or national character of the nation, a
criticism that risks becoming a justification for illiberal authoritarianism. Consider
objections to women's or L.G.B.T.Q. rights rooted in "national" character. See, e.g.,
Tracy Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARv.

WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 89 (1996).
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must reconcile themselves to that existence but must also make peace
with the existence with other nomoi and under the influence of a larger
set of values, norms, and commitments. Given the opportunity, any of
these nomoi would seek to impose their views on others, and many
envision a world where their nomos reigns supreme. Nomoi seek to
influence the idea of nation, reconciling the commitments of their
insular community with the demands of existence in the nation, but
also creating accounts of the nation that reconcile it to their insular
commitments. Government is the tantalizing temptation. For control
over local, regional, or national government institutions promises to
permit a nomos to colonize the national ideal and impose itself on
others: "[Siome would transform civil authority into an intolerant arm
of their own substantive vision when the chance arose[.]" 228
National identity is influenced by the extant government, but
the construction and maintenance of national identity has long been the
substance of literary elites and their peers, who could both construct a
national identity from lore and history of the society and had the
influence to convince leaders of the state to embrace that identity as
the defining feature of the community. 229 In the middle of the
twentieth century, radio and television gave national leaders a perch
from which to exert additional influence on the national identity of
some nations, even as the proliferation of broadcasts simultaneously
undermined the centrality of government leaders in developing a
national identity. 230 Authoritarian regimes came to be characterized as
much by their suppression of media and thought as by their arrest and
assassination of dissidents. Today, authoritarianstates are increasingly
sophisticated in their efforts to control the new media of our timesocial media and internet-based communications. 23 1 While arrests and
detention persist, along with other mechanisms of state terror, much of
228 Cover, supra note 1, at 31.
229
230

This is the principal argument of ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 4.
Control of media came to be regarded as a key factor in successful coup d'6tat:
One of the first actions of a successful coup d'etat is the seizure of
broadcasting facilities. The more receiver sets in the country the easier it

is for the new regime to consolidate its victory by rapid dissemination of
news. This only hold true if the broadcasting facilities are relatively
concentrated and accessible to seizure. If they are not taken they may be
a powerful source of opposition.

Alan Wells, The Coup d'Etat in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in
the 1960s, 79 AM. J. Socio. 871, 879 (1974).
231 Eda Keremoglu & Nils B. Weidmann, How Dictators Control the Internet: A
Review Essay, 53 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1690, 1691 (2020).
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the battle for control over a country plays out in the media where fights
to shape the national identity are fought. Populist nationalists seek to
gain control of the state 232 and to influence media platforms in an effort
to impose their vision of the nation. 23 3
If Nomoi are competing to influence the extant national
identity every bit as much as they compete to influence the
jurisprudence under which they will live, the rights adequate to restrain
the nation state take on a new character. A rights regime must envision
a decentralized, privatized battle for meaning with the same
consequences as democratic elections with or without the episodic
character, that at one point in time grants authority to a set group of
people who obtain power and are subject to the limitation of (first
dimension) rights. Instead, rights must protect individuals in a
dynamic process where any given person might be both a power holder
and a victim, depending on what aspect of their identity is being
discussed. The individual's identity will draw meaning from historical
precedent, contemporary groups, and future aspirations, as well as the
interaction of all of these with one another, and with notions of the
Katherine Stewart, Christian Nationalism Is One of Trump's Most Powerful
Weapons,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Jan.
6,
2022),

232

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01 /06/opinion/jan-6-christian-nationalism.html
("Opposition to public education is part of the DNA of America's religious right.
The movement came together in the 1970s not solely around abortion politics, as
later mythmakers would have it, but around the outrage of the I.R.S. threatening to
take away the tax-exempt status of church-led 'segregation academies.' In 1979,
Jerry Falwell said he hoped to see the day when there wouldn't be 'any public
schools-the churches will have taken them over again and Christians will be running

them.').
233 At least one author has characterized religious support for Donald Trump as a
fulfillment of religious nationalists' engagement with popular culture.
This is the argument Kristin .Kobes Du Mez, a historian at Calvin
University, makes in her new book Jesus and John Wayne. According to

Du Mez, evangelical leaders have spent decades using the tools of pop
culture - films, music, television, and the internet - to grow the
movement. The result, she says, is a Christianity that mirrors that culture.

Instead of modeling their lives on Christ, evangelicals have made heroes
of people like John wayne and Mel Gibson, people who project a more
militant and more nationalist image. In that sense, Trump's strongman

shtick is a near-perfect expression of their values.
Sean Illing, Is Evangelical Support for Trump a Contradiction?: A religious
HistorianExplains Why Trump Wasn't a Trade-offfor American Evangelicals, Vox
https://www.vox.com/policy-and2020),
12,
(Jul
politics/2020/7/9/21291493/donald-trump-evangelical-christians-kristin-kobes-dumez.
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These notions might be exaggerations or
prevailing order.
misapprehensions of the world around the individual; the linchpin is

fluidity.
An adequate rights regime protects individuals from abuse by
the state and its governmental apparatuses and protects individuals
from being sidelined in the now more expansive contest over what is
the identity of the nation. Government can crush individuals through
its power to act without due process in ways that disrespect individuals
as citizens with diverse views of government, and by ultimately
destroying the individual though torture and extrajudicial killing. But
the nation, though not necessarily armed with the government
apparatus, can do similar damage to individuals. And individuals must
be protected, though not exclusively or necessarily from government
activity that deprives them of participation in the nation formation
process.
Given the non-state centered processes characteristic of the
nation formation, a word is necessary on what protection of individuals
from the nation might involve. Negative rights envision limits on what
a state can do. Those limits are aimed at directly preventing
government harm on its citizens through summary execution or
disappearances-that is, punishments of a certain type and
punishments imposed without due process.2 3 4 The range of activities
limited by rights are not all encompassing and much of our
jurisprudence has been focused on drawing the line between when a
state can act and when it cannot. In the center of such direct limits are
due process disputes that ultimately turn on the degree judgmentshow much process is due.
Limitations on government behavior also operate to protect
individuals from state excesses indirectly. States' authority is limited
to ensure that citizens can participate in their government. Not only
are voting rights to be protected to ensure that individuals are equal
before the law and can all participate in the forming of a government,
but they also ensure that individuals have a say in what government
policy is (albeit a small say according to public choice theorists). 2 35
234 Consider, for example, Articles 6, 9, and 13-15 of the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), which
guarantee a right to life and numerous due process rights, respectively.
231 See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 135 (1957) (setting out what came to be known as the Downs' paradox-that
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Authoritarian states seek to hold control over the state apparatus for a
subset of the community, but they also seek to exclude others from
having a say in what ought to be policy. Since these two aspects of
authoritarianism operate together, it is easy to miss that exclusion of
the individual from the polity is part of what government terror does.
An individual is generally protected directly from the excesses
of the nation through limits on the state's use of power. Therefore,
states cannot declare a community outside the law because of
differences over what the vision of the nation is. This direct protection
is critical, but it is not the only way that a national consensus can be
used to marginalize a minority community. The national consensus
might render a minority community marginal effectively through
private behavior. For sure through lynching, but also by discrimination
and institutional bias can a national consensus operate to render a
community as subordinate. Immediately, it should be apparent that the
dimension of individual versus nation provides a solution to the state
action problem that troubled efforts to legislate prohibitions against
discrimination. 23 6 Jim Crow's private segregation, discrimination, and
terror were not especially better where they were accomplished
without state imprimatur. A satisfactory rights regime needs to be
empowered to address the private terror and impunity that the
individual versus government dimension is already adequate to
address, but also the wholly private bias that says certain individuals
are not a part of the nation. Our current justification for reaching such
behavior is, unsatisfactorily, rooted in Congress' commerce clause
power, which is to say its discretion. 2 37
If the efforts to protect the individual against the state vary from
prohibited-to-permissible state behavior with degree judgments about
how much process is due, efforts to protect individuals from the
excesses of the nation are similarly variable. While the "national"
community ought to be prohibited from lynching, terrorizing, and
exiling minority communities, protection of the individual from the

for the rational, self-interested voter the cost of voting will normally exceed the
expected benefits).
236 The Court flirted with abandoning the state action requirement in United States v.

383 U.S. 745, 764-70 (1966).
Guest,
23

1 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 271 (1964) (Black,
J., concurring) ("[T]he power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is
plenary, 'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."').
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nation does not mean that a national identity or national community
must reflect the views and identity of all its members, as such.
Between these extremes lie questions that are every bit as much degree
judgments as were the "how much process is due" questions between
We currently call these questions antiindividual and state.
discrimination questions and we have tended to treat them as relatively
absolute because we force them into and answer them as though they
were questions of equal protection before the law.
This set of protections can be seen in those aspects of Nomos
and Narrative that sought to keep competing nomoi from devolving
into a battle of all against all. This important role for the state perhaps
seemed unsatisfyingly narrow in Nomos and Narrativebecause of the
article's focus on courts' role in interpreting law which required judges
to select between competing jurisprudential visions of opposing
While an earnest and discerning government might
nomoi.
theoretically perfectly reflect the competing nomoi of its citizens, the
dynamic, fluid process of national identity formation is probably
incapable of truly reflecting the national vision of all aspects of even
the most homogeneous community. If such a state nomos did come
into being, Cover suggests it would quickly collapse. 238 In any event,
such a state nomos on nation would likely be so banal a vision that,
though most might be able to identify with it, it would provide
insufficient depth to be meaningful.2 3 9
Most important, however, the nation lacks an independent
means of enforcing itself. A national vision is persuasive because it
tells a story of the people that the people choose to accept as
convincing and which they choose to accept to define themselves in
some contexts. 24 0 This mostly informal process is unlikely to result in
238 Cover suggested:
But the very "jurispotence" of such a vision threatens it. Were there some
pure paideic normative order for a fleeting moment, a philosopher would
surely emerge to challenge the illusion of its identity with truth. The
unification of meaning that stands at its center exists only for an instant,
and that instant is itself imaginary. Differences arise immediately about
the meaning of creeds, the content of common worship, the identity of
those who are brothers and sisters.

Cover, supra note 1, at 15.
239 One could not "love" it in Ferrari's terms. Ferrari, supra note 166, at 759-60.
24 This is akin to the limited authority Cover permits states in articulating meaning:
The "very disturbing" consequence is that
there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as
power and the organization of law as meaning. This dichotomy, manifest
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unanimous assent and any embrace of a national vision is also unlikely
to be static, gaining and losing adherents even as it also changes itself.
Thus, the direct role of rights protecting individuals from the nationthe role comparable to preventing torture or disappearances by the
government-should be aimed at protecting individuals from both
state abuse and excesses of nonstate actors in the name of nation, much
more so than trying to regulate the content of the national ideal. The
more important role of rights protecting the individual from the nation
is the indirect one: ensuring that individuals can meaningfully
participate in the creation and evolution of a national identity.
The indirect role of protecting individuals from the nation
consist of at least three distinct projects: a libertarian project, a
communitarian project, and an intersectional project. That is, ensuring
indirectly that nomoi can flourish, ensuring jurisgenesis, turns on
ensuring individuals can be who they are, form and participate in
vibrant communities, and exist comfortably in different communities
to the extent they choose and in ways that they choose. 2 4 1 Though one

in folk and underground cultures in even the most authoritarian societies,
is particularly open to view in a liberal society that disclaims control over
narrative. The uncontrolled character of meaning exercises a destabilizing
influence upon power. Precepts must "have meaning," but they necessarily
borrow it from materials created by social activity that is not subject to the
strictures of provenance that characterize what we call formal lawmaking.
Even when authoritative institutions try to create meaning for the precepts
they articulate, they act, in that respect, in an unprivileged fashion.

Cover, supra note 1, at 18.
24 As Paul Kahn said of communitarian and individualism in his critique of new
communitarian thinking in 1989:
Instead of a problematic relationship of part (citizen) to whole (state), in
which either the part or the whole threatens to subsume the other, the new
communitarians understand the relationship of the individual to the
political order as that of the microcosm to the macrocosm. We create and

maintain our personal identity in the very same process by which
communal identity is created and maintained. Thus, the historically
specific discourse, which is at the center of communitarian theory,
simultaneously creates the individual and the community. Individual

identity does not exist apart from the discourse that creates and sustains
the community. There is no self to understand, apart from the community,
just as there is no community apart from the members. Neither the
community nor the individual has any priority-temporally, conceptually,
or normatively. Individual and community are two perspectives on a

single process of discursive particularity. Within this universe of
discourse, we cannot separate the talker from the talking: Both the
individual and the community exist only in the talking.

Kahn, supra note 136, at 5.
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might object to the focus on individuals here, that is a function of my
focus on rights as protections from state activity and from certain
abuses from private actors. These distinct projects reflect the ways that
one is an individual with distinct attributes, the importance of
communities, groups, ethnicities, and even nations to one's sense of
self, and the multiple ways one can exist in different identities at one
time, often even contradictory identities. The aim of this thinking
about rights is both to guarantee the individual's ability to be all these
things while also promoting contact between communities through
their constituent members that will foment and develop nomoi, and
therefore jurisgenesis.
Ensuring that individuals can meaningfully participate in
national identity creation and evolution requires that individuals can
be who it is they think they are. This is a libertarian project. Protection
of individuals' ability to form and maintain a sense of self, independent
of any group with which they might be associated is critical to ensuring
their ability to participate in the national identity forming project. On
some level, this kind of protection has traditionally been inseparable
from ideas like freedom of conscience, since those capable of
influencing the national identity tend to be authors, reporters, and
community activists who could command the attention of the local or
foreign press. The right to "be you," so to speak, was inseparable from
the freedom of press or right to free association. However, today, the
ability of individuals to directly communicate their views on social
media has been freed to some extent from the gatekeeping function of
the publication business. It has also permitted individuals to carefully
curate a public image in a way previously reserved to celebrities with
publicists. True, the goal for many is to become an influencer-a
contemporary pitchman for products, lifestyles, and the sort.242
However, the expanded space for individuals to shout out, "here I am,
and this is what I believe," has permitted many with formally
marginalized identities to come to the fore and engage in civic life in a
way that they could not before. 243 Rights must protect their ability to
See, e.g., Kati Chitrokorn, Influencers Get an Upgrade. Now They're in Charge,
VOGUE Bus., Nov. 17, 2021 (setting out current trends in business of fashion
influencers); Sapna Maheshwari, Online and Making Thousands, at Age 4: Meet the
Kidfluencers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2019 (on lucrative opportunities for child
influencers).
242

243 See generally MARTIN GURRI, THE REVOLT OF THE PUBLIC AND THE CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2018).
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engage with others, participate in new communities, form nomoi, and
Promoting
influence the development of the national identity.
jurisgenesis would seem to encourage individuals to join affinity
groups of all kinds, perhaps including illiberal ones.
Ensuring that individuals can meaningfully participate in the
creation and evolution of a national identity requires protection of
members of groups. This is a communitarian project. As Nomos and
Narrativespecifically urged, respect for groups is necessary since they
are the source of normative meaning in our complex societies. 244
Rights must protect groups as such to ensure that they can be the
vibrant sources of meaning for our complex society. At a time when
membership in voluntary affiliation groups is on the wane, and
association with organized religions is also declining, state and private
efforts to undermine groups must be combated. Naturally, the kinds
of groups that ought to be protected cannot be previously determined.
However, it is even more difficult to determine how to respond to
illiberal groups aimed at stopping participation of others in civil
society. Ultimately, protection of the ability to participate in national
identity formation likely tips the scale against protection of illiberal
groups, at least insofar as they seek to undermine competing nomoi.
As Cover noted, "[t]he sober imperial mode of world maintenance
holds the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the
discipline of institutional justice upon norms, and places the constraint
of peace on the void at which strong bonds cease." 2 5 A guiding
principle of the communitarian project has to be peace between nomoi,
and therefore a skepticism about nomoi that claims exclusive control
of the state, superiority over others, or exceptionalism freeing its
members from shared obligations of citizenship. Ensuring jurisgenesis
seems to require a kind of golden rule for groups, limiting those that
seek to squelch the existence of other groups.
Ensuring individuals can meaningfully participate in national
identity formation and development requires recognition of the partial
This is an
and multifaceted ways individuals exist in nomoi.
of
this
project.
is
the
enemy
Essentialism
project.
intersectional
Promoting jurisgenesis requires recognition of the role of the paideic
"for combining corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment to
Cover, supra note 1, at 66 ("In our own complex nomos, however, it is the
manifold, equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute the
array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at any given time.").
244

245

Id. at 16.
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form a nomos." 246 The world-creating aspect of the paideic invokes
"(1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and
personal way of being educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of
direction or growth that is constituted as the individual and his
community work out the implications of their law." 247 Nomoi are not
formed on a whim, but by interpersonal commitment. Yet, there is
nothing to bar commitment to many, perhaps even contradictory,
communities. Indeed, people are, we now understand, many things at
once. Protecting rights for the purpose of promoting jurisgenesis
suggests that we will find people as they are, complex, contradictory,
and changing. The intersectional project is aimed at ensuring that this
aspect of the person is recognized.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the promotion of jurisgenesis' goal suggests that a
fecund ground for the production of nomoi is what rights ought to
promote. Such a goal does not make easy questions related to conflicts
between nomoi or even individual rights and group rights. Aside from
a relatively small set of protections against state action (death and
exile) or extreme private behavior (lynching), this approach to rights
sets many claims as questions of degree (antidiscrimination). Such
protections, however, work to bring communities together, to promote
interaction between them, to challenge their stability through contact
with others, even as it refocuses members on the value of their
communities by distinction with others. This is the value associated
with diversity, and with efforts to promote it, equity and inclusion in
recent years. Cover was careful to note that the existence of groups
alone does not create nomoi. Instead,
[F]rom time to time various groups ... create an entire
nomos-an integrated world of obligation and reality
from which the rest of the world is perceived. At that
point of radical transformation of perspective, the
boundary . . . becomes more than a rule: it becomes
constitutive of a world. We witness normative mitosis.
A world is turned inside out; a wall begins to form, and

246 Id. at 12.
24 7

Id. at 12-13.
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its shape differs depending upon which side of the wall
our narratives place us on.2 48

248

Id. at 31.
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